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ABSTRACT 
It is crucial for the United States to confront the increasing incidence of Americans who 
turn to violence against their fellow citizens in support of Islamist terrorists. This thesis 
explores the application of “soft power,” the government’s ability to mitigate the 
recruitment and radicalization of new terrorists by attraction rather than coercion, in order 
to prevent “homegrown” terrorism. Methods include a comparative policy analysis of 
counterterrorism models in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, a survey of 
conservative Muslim leaders in the Houston area, and an extensive literature review. 
Recent arrests portend an increasing threat if the United States continues along its “hard 
power” path exclusively. Potential solutions require active engagement by government 
leaders, coordinated messaging, and continuing contact between government agencies 
and vulnerable communities. A broad national strategy, refined and implemented at a 
regional level, is required. Strategies that balance hard and soft power separate 
radicalizing influences from their recruiting pool, alter the social context of potential 
recruits in favor of democratic process, and make partners of potential antagonists. 
Regional Outreach and Operational Coordination Centers (ROOCC) offer a mechanism 
to develop and support strategies that combine government, nongovernment, and 
community leaders to combat terrorism at the ideological level. 
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Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without 
strategy is the noise before defeat. 
-Sun Tzu 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
According to a recent report issued by the former heads of the 9/11 Commission,  
Our long-held belief that homegrown terrorism couldn't happen here has 
… created a situation where we are today stumbling blindly through the 
legal, operational and organizational minefield of countering terrorist 
radicalization and recruitment occurring in the United States.… [As a 
result NCTC and a National Security Council (NSC) and representatives 
from 13 federal agencies are currently] … looking at ways to counter 
violent extremism within the U.S. and abroad. (Baldor, 2010)  
While NCTC national-level policies must be authored by a centralized 
component, it is important to understand that execution of counterterrorism policies will 
be implemented at the regional and local level, where local contexts provide unique 
challenges and opportunities (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 11). Those charged with 
counterterrorism missions would benefit from enhanced understanding derived from 
trusting interpersonal relationships with referent leaders of at-risk and immigrant Muslim 
populations. Counterterrorism leaders must also coordinate among all layers of 
government to develop regionally and locally tailored strategies that employ both hard 
and soft power.  
Current strategies to prevent, detect, and disrupt terrorist activity in the United 
States are vague and focus on disrupting already planned attacks or the physical security 
of critical infrastructure. This is a reactive policy. While aggressive response to a known 
threat or vulnerability is a critical component for any counterterrorism strategy, this 
posture forces the nation to continually respond to situations that are already dangerous, a 
situation akin to treating symptoms, rather than the underlying disease. Failure to adapt 
our approach to terrorism ensures that the government will remain on the defensive. More 
importantly, such a one-dimensional strategy is unsustainable over the long haul. The 
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homeland security community should develop a holistic plan to prevent the development 
of homegrown terrorists and the maturation of domestic terrorist threats to complement 
existing counterterrorism measures. To be most effective, the national strategy should 
permeate federal, state, and local approaches to both counterterrorism and social policy. 
The reactive posture of the United States government was an understandable 
result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when the government was faced with 
confronting imminent follow-on attacks. The government reorganized to facilitate 
intelligence sharing and to coordinate counterterrorism activities. Key among these 
changes were the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), the Department of Defense’s Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and 
reformation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Each of these organizations, in 
whole or in part, is charged with preventing terrorist attacks in the homeland.  
To complicate matters further, the threat posed by al Qaeda has evolved in form 
and function. Experts disagree regarding the nature of international terrorism today 
(Sciolino & Schmitt, 2008). One side of the argument suggests that al Qaeda has survived 
the attempts of the United States to destroy or dismantle it and that al Qaeda continues to 
represent the principal, though not the only, threat to the United States (Hoffman 2006a; 
2008). The other position posits that much of al Qaeda’s core leadership cadre has been 
captured or killed and that therefore today’s threat is from relatively disorganized, self-
generating terrorist cells that operate independent of al Qaeda direction (Sageman, 2008). 
If the former position is correct, the United States can expect a continuation of dramatic, 
internationally directed terrorist attacks that may be years in the planning, highly 
sophisticated, and strategically designed. The implication of the latter finding is that the 
United States can expect isolated cells with relatively less capability to conduct attacks, 
and those based on opportunity, rather than a broader strategy. An accurate portrayal of 
the threat likely falls somewhere between these positions, with al Qaeda’s main leaders 
still alive but operating at reduced capability, while self-radicalizing extremists and 
“wannabe terrorist” organizations develop and act in support of similar ideology. We face 
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two differentiated threats: one from al Qaeda and associated external groups and an 
emerging threat from those radicalized in the United States. 
As a result of the structural changes and the evolving threat, there are three 
fundamental conditions that complicate the federal government’s efforts to mitigate 
future terrorist threats to the United States: 
1) Lack of unified command and holistic counterterrorism strategy. 
Overlapping missions, lack of clear guidance, and informal coordination 
points among agencies result in inefficient effort.  
2) A short-term, reactive approach to terrorism that focuses principally on the 
external threat and ignores radicalization of American Muslims.  
3) Lack of a coordinated engagement strategy, resulting in a lack of 
understanding of the underlying causes of radicalism, an inability to build 
trusting relationships, and an inadequate intelligence base within the 
Muslim-American community. 
No government strategy can altogether eliminate the threat of terrorist activity, 
but well-reasoned, concerted efforts may mitigate the likelihood of terrorist group 
formation. Positive and trusting relationships between homeland security authorities and 
religious and minority group leaders may facilitate the identification of threats as they 
emerge. A concerted engagement strategy might provide opportunities to shape 
community opinion and to disrupt terrorist threats in their earliest stages. The inclusion of 
soft power tactics to win or keep the “hearts and minds” of Muslim-American citizens is 
critical to long-term success against terrorism by Islamic extremists. 
With no grand counterterrorist strategy, progress toward goals and objectives is 
difficult to judge. Although current disruption tactics are an intrinsic part of a national 
counterterrorism strategy, such a one-dimensional policy will require more resources, 
produce a false sense of crisis that jades the public, increase “burnout” of those charged 
with the mission, and tend to alienate the very portion of the public we depend on to help 
identify and confront the threat. The United States owes its public more than this. With 
no clear “owner” of the counterterrorism mission, there is no authority that provides 
guidance for collaborative effort, nor is there a holistic strategy to address radicalization. 
  4
Federal, state, and local resources are spent on agencies that work toward identical 
objectives independently, rather than collaborating to address common goals. Duplicative 
efforts reduce the potential of these organizations to address other important missions that 
also contribute to national security and public safety. 
Few terrorist groups end due to military action (Jones & Libicki, 2008), which 
implies that the terrorist strategy currently pursued abroad will not “win” the war on 
terror. In the domestic environment, military action against terrorists is not a realistic 
option, and as such tactics have demonstrated overseas (Pew Research Center, 2007), 
heavy-handed tactics can create sympathy for the terrorists’ cause. Like any complex 
problem set, the causes of terrorist activity in the United States are numerous and vary 
from group to group—and perhaps from individual to individual. The development and 
execution of engagement strategies would benefit from a less centralized structure to 
assist in understanding local dynamics that may exacerbate radicalization and inform 
national policies—ultimately providing more efficient methods to win the “battle of 
ideas” that underpins Islamist ideology.1 Reactive counterterrorism strategies, on the 
other hand, ignore the development of new threats and thus require more and more 
resources to disrupt them. It stands to reason that as threats continue to emerge, the odds 
of an opponent’s success are higher.  
These challenges warrant further research, because they present an opportunity 
for the United States government to enhance its capability to prevent not just terrorist 
attacks, but also the formation of new terrorist groups, particularly in the homeland. 
Additional research may result in more efficient application of resources to the 
counterterrorism mission, may increase the effectiveness of the homeland security 
community, and may contribute to a culture both inside and outside the government that 
enables concerted action to prevent terrorist attacks. 
It is not clear how the United States currently implements best practices or lessons 
learned from its own agencies or from the experiences of other governments to increase 
effectiveness and efficiency of the domestic counterterrorism effort. Homeland security 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this thesis, the term “Islamist” refers to one who views Islam not only as a religion 
but as a political philosophy that is incompatible with democracy. 
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agencies in the United States do not function as learning organizations and are not 
structured to do so. The homeland security community should explore the creation of a 
holistic strategy that is informed by other Western governments and the study of terrorist 
groups. Such a strategy must be applied through a unified effort and with the flexibility 
needed to address a constantly evolving threat. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Is the United States counterterrorism strategy correctly aligned to counter the 
terrorist threat?  
Is the current organizational structure of the homeland security community 
appropriate to address the nature of the terrorist threat? 
What strategic lessons from the counterterrorism experiences of the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands can and should be applied in the United States? 
How can the homeland security community leverage intelligence and “soft 
power” tactics to build more effective antiterrorism/antiradicalization policies and 
initiatives? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Understanding Radicalization 
The academic study of terrorist groups since September 11 has been prolific and 
provides insight regarding how terrorist groups form, become motivated to violence, and 
eventually lose their appeal to the public—ultimately resulting in the terrorists group’s 
failure and disintegration. Court filings, government studies, and Congressional 
testimony further expand information from recognized subject-matter experts that will 
inform this study. Bruce Hoffman and Brian Jenkins have produced substantial works 
that suggest radicalization is a principal concern for the foreseeable future. Marc 
Sageman has also contributed significant research regarding the psychological 
background of known terrorists. These works and others will be explored to define the 
challenge of and potential strategies to address radicalization. 
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Social identity theory (SIT) “is based on an insistence that human action needs to 
be understood in its social context.” (Reicher, 2004) This theory may provide a 
foundation for understanding the radicalization phenomenon, but there are disagreements 
regarding its core components. Rational actor theory, which suggests that most 
individuals tend to act in accordance with their perceived best interests, will also inform 
this study. Likewise, instrumental approaches contribute to the study at a macrolevel, 
when exploring the nature of terrorist groups. Sufficient discourse is available in 
academic literature to explore how these theories might apply to counterterrorism 
strategies.  
The psychology of terrorists has been explored in depth over the past 40 years. By 
building a holistic strategy based on our understanding of the behavior of terrorist groups, 
we may be able to expedite the demise of terrorist groups. There is sufficient literature on 
group behavior to inform this thesis. 
2. Muslim-American Perspectives on Countering Islamist Ideology 
There is little published work regarding the attitudes of Muslim-Americans and 
their willingness or ability to accept an identity that has more affinity to “American-ness” 
than ethnic and religious roots. Sparse research is documented regarding likely sources of 
support and influence in countering Islamic radicalization, although the academic 
community seems to accept that Muslim-Americans enjoy better relationships with 
government and the general public in the United States than in Europe. Interviews will 
focus on leadership of local religious and ethnic organizations. Information from these 
interviews may identify group characteristics that indicate a willingness to assist the 
intelligence community in countering “Islam versus the United States” rhetoric. 
3. Smart Practices of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
The essence of insurgent warfare remains constant—the insurgent must have the 
passive support of a large segment of the population in order to succeed against the 
existing government or occupying force. The Irish Republic Army Chief of Staff Cathal 
Goulding admitted in 1962, “Without the support of the majority of the people, we just 
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couldn’t succeed” (Geraghty, 1998, p. 351). Similarly, global jihadists2 must have the 
support of a segment of the population, albeit much less support is needed for these 
terrorists to accomplish their goals in the United States than for an insurgency that 
intends to overthrow and replace a standing government. The importance of public 
support has resonated through insurgent and terrorist organizations during the last half-
century and has been employed for over a decade by al Qaeda and similarly inclined 
Islamic militants here in the United States. As Steven Metz notes: 
Insurgency … combines continuity and change, an enduring essence and a 
shifting nature. Its essence is protracted, asymmetric violence; political, 
legal, and ethical ambiguity; and the use of complex terrain, psychological 
warfare, and political mobilization. It arises when a group decides that the 
gap between their political expectations and the opportunities afforded 
them is unacceptable and can only be remedied by force. (2007, p. 1) 
While core al Qaeda does not appear to seek replacement of the governmental 
system in the United States, it does seek to alternately coerce the American public to alter 
its foreign policy and to promote a “United States versus Islam” ideology in the segment 
of the population from which it seeks funding, materiel, and recruits. Some of the 
characteristics of insurgent warfare, as described by Goulding and Metz, have parallels in 
the homeland security community’s counterterrorism efforts. Like the creation of the 
DHS and the restructuring of the FBI after the attacks of September 11, recent struggles 
with insurgents have resulted in a complete overhaul of United States military strategy 
for counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (United States Army, 2009). 
The Department of Defense altered its structure and its tactics to focus on the mass 
population—it may likewise be necessary for the domestic security community to 
reassess the value of “soft power” (Nye, 2003) in order to frustrate and disrupt the appeal 
of Islamist ideologies in the homeland. 
                                                 
2 While it is recognized that the term “jihadist” has both positive and negative connotations based on 
its context, for the purpose of this thesis, the term is used to describe Islamists who support, promote, 
participate in, or otherwise subscribe to the use of violence to further Islamist ideology. 
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Multiple studies of successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are available 
in academic work and peer-reviewed journals. The experiences of the United Kingdom in 
Malaysia and Ireland; the Peruvian struggle versus the Shining Path; and the United 
States’ experience in El Salvador all lend broad principles for the development of a 
domestic counterterrorist strategy.  
Due to the prominence of asymmetrical warfare in modern history and its impact 
on foreign policy, the literature available on this topic is dense and rich in military tactics. 
The body of work is less informative when applied to the domestic sociological and 
political tactics. The literature is sufficient only to scope key points of COIN strategies, 
points also readily available in Western counterterrorism practices. COIN provides key 
principles but they are of limited direct applicability to a domestic counterterrorism 
strategy. 
4. Western Strategies for Counterterrorism 
Several Western countries have coordinated governmental responses to the threat 
of terrorism. Their approaches vary, as does the applicability of these strategies in the 
United States. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have developed more specific 
“radicalization models” that identify key points where intervention might stop or reverse 
the radicalization process. The UK proposed community-based interaction with an aim 
“to reduce the risk [to the state] … and its interests overseas from international terrorism, 
so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence” (United Kingdom 
[UK], 2009, p. 5). Similarly, the Netherlands executes “a broad-based policy aimed at 
increasing resistance to [radicalization] … a society that is resilient enough to resist the 
growth of violent radicalization” (Remkes & Donner, 2005). 
The Netherlands, too, changed its way of doing business to fit the 
counterterrorism mission. A joint service center was created to coordinate the 
counterterrorism mission across multiple government agencies. Like the UK, 
counterterrorism specialists permeate the counterterrorism effort from the national level 
to local police boards that devise local strategies to counter radicalization. Local & 
municipal decision makers coordinate social strategies to prevent polarization in 
  9
individual communities. The common philosophy behind these strategies is that 
government at all levels must understand and act on “new terrorism” as an ideological 
battle. Ideology—not race, or ethnic derivation, or cultural identity—is perceived as a 
threat and is explicitly targeted, although these factors may serve to isolate minority 
populations from the general society. 
Conversely, the United States’ counterterrorism efforts are predominantly reactive 
and tend to function in ways that address identified plots rather than radicalization. As 
such, the homeland security community faces the dynamic nature and complexity of 
terrorism threats with no “end game” goal, multiple definitions of the domestic security 
mission (Bellavita, 2008), and overlapping jurisdictions that can cause internecine 
rivalries. 
Sufficient literature exists in criminology and sociological studies to suggest that 
a version of “community policing” may provide a model that should be adopted to 
enhance intelligence collection. A Department of Justice (DOJ) review found that when 
police and communities develop a partnership based on trust, the public is more likely to 
report suspicious activity (United States Department of Justice [USDOJ], 2003).  
Some of the foreign counterterrorism strategies have acknowledged the 
importance of countering an internal threat, but none establishes specific goals or 
provides metrics that might indicate success or failure. The inability to measure the 
quality of government-Muslim relationships poses a substantial challenge to engagement 
strategies. There has been little research that explains how best to employ community 
outreach to diminish radicalization. The thesis will contribute to this area of literature. 
5. Conclusion 
There is sufficient literature and academic research to define the counterterrorism 
mission of the United States as an ideological war that will be fought on American soil 
(Abu ’Ubeid, 2002). This point was emphasized in 2009 by mujahedeen training in 
Raleigh, North Carolina; exportation of al Shabaab terrorists from Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, to Somalia; the terrorist attack at Fort Hood, Texas, and an attempted aircraft 
bombing in Detroit, Michigan. These events demonstrated beyond any doubt that Islamist 
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radicalization has reached the heartland of the homeland. No longer can we afford to 
ignore Islamist radicalization in the United States. This thesis will recommend proactive 
“soft” strategies to address Islamist terrorism by actively countering radicalization based 
on lessons learned from COIN, best practices from other nations, and the study of 
terrorist groups. 
D. HYPOTHESES OR TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
The central claims of this thesis are:  
1. Long-term success in counterterrorism is dependent on disruption of the 
radicalization process. 
2. A network-based structure is needed to effectively counter 
religious/ideological terrorism in the long term. A regional, joint service 
structure is needed.  
3. Interpersonal engagement between the government and both religious and 
cultural groups is necessary to counter violent ideologies over the long 
term.  
4. A collective strategy must be introduced to develop and guide a national 
doctrine that permeates every level of the counterterrorism effort. For this 
reason, the collective strategy must consolidate leadership authority of the 
counterterrorism mission in a way that includes leaders at the federal, 
state, and major city levels. 
5. The leadership of such a team must be well positioned to predict 
community reaction to a plethora of stimuli, from foreign policy to law 
enforcement action, as well as to influence community actions through 
information sharing and public messaging. For this reason, the 
coordination team must exercise sufficient legitimate and perhaps 
budgetary power to directly impact operations. 
Academic research reveals that terrorist groups are rarely defeated by military 
power alone. Much more often, negotiation and policing are the keys to success (Jones & 
Libicki, 2008). In order for domestic policing to be most effective, detailed intelligence is 
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required, and that comes only through interaction with the target population. Moreover, 
engagement is necessary to develop understanding of the community’s grievances—the 
first step in addressing valid concerns of populations that feel disenfranchised. Informed 
by direct interaction, the government can devise practical solutions to radicalization. 
Such interaction might also increase public perception of the government and support 
efforts to collect human intelligence in a noncoercive manner from communities that are 
likely to be most closely associated with individuals who are in the radicalization process. 
Evidence that a segment of the Muslim-American population is inclined to 
support efforts to counter radicalization within its own community is demonstrated in 
Congressional testimony, on websites of Islamic and ethno-cultural organizations, and in 
public statements. In some instances, state, local, and federal agencies have enjoyed 
success in developing positive relationships with Muslim communities and as a result 
have reported an increase in intelligence collection. A few religious and civil libertarian 
organizations publicly promote engagement with law enforcement or try to serve as a 
bridge between the community and law enforcement. If trusting relationships between the 
government and influential community leaders could be leveraged, these organizations 
might be key partners in counter-radicalization, particularly with first- and second-
generation citizens who are perhaps more isolated than integrated in American culture.  
Centers of influence from both religious and cultural groups can serve to 
effectively counter violent ideologies if they are engaged in collaborative relationships 
with government agencies. The objective of government and community leaders should 
be to deprive terrorist groups of public support. Even engagement with leaders who are 
hostile to the government might serve to inform local policies or disruption strategies. 
Sociological studies provide insight regarding how law enforcement leaders can better 
understand how Muslim organizations interact within and between one another. Through 
interpersonal contact across a broad spectrum of Muslim groups and enhanced cultural 
awareness, government officials may better serve the communities’ needs and better 
understand the dynamics that drive extremist groups’ behavior.  
By establishing mutual trust, the moderate Muslim-American community and the 
government can collaborate against violent extremism and strengthen our resistance to 
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the “United States versus Islam” narrative. The collective effort can thus deny or mitigate 
the principle resource they need for success—support of the Muslim. A collaborative 
relationship may also facilitate identification of those being radicalized and cognitive 
openings in extremists during periods when they might be vulnerable to recruitment or 
susceptible to compromise. As noted by Paul Davis, Islamic militants “often mistrust and 
fight among each other, disagree and vary in conviction. It should be possible, then, to 
turn them against each other by disinformation or deception” (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 
47). 
A common theme across the spectrum of asymmetrical warfare, from COIN to 
foreign counterterrorism, is the need for an overarching strategy, a doctrine that is 
administered by a centralized authority and serves as a base of context for independent 
actions. Successful strategies are flexible and decentralized in their execution, with great 
emphasis on diminishing or preventing the spread of the opposition’s influence on the 
local population. The United States should learn from these experiences to develop a 
grand strategy, a formal doctrine that is informed by the results of ideological struggles. 
In order to counter the appeal of terrorism, it is necessary for the government to 
identify and fully engage with centers of influence (referent leaders) of at-risk and 
immigrant populations across the whole spectrum of society. Homeland security 
representatives must be willing to listen, seek to understand, and address legitimate 
grievances presented by the community. Federal agencies should play a key role in this 
endeavor due to the national security interest, as well as their ability to impact matters of 
great concern to the Islamic community: foreign policy, immigration, customs matters, 
and civil rights. Regional variances and enforcement opportunities allow action at state 
and local levels, thus state and local collaboration is critical to successful implementation. 
Many immigrant communities derive from a tribal or patrician background where trust is 
dependent on familiarity and regular interaction, further emphasizing the need for 
continuity in government efforts. Critics of federally run operations will likely suggest 
that state and local police are better placed for this mission through their daily interaction 
with the public and police departments’ long experience in community policing. But 
implementation of community policing efforts varies widely—like counterterrorism, 
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there is no standardization of effort, no formal implementation of best practices. The 
proposed outreach is focused at centers of influence: state and major-city chiefs should be 
incorporated in the coordination effort, but they will be restricted by their individual 
budgets, local politics, their public safety mission, and other variables. Further, 
intelligence collection pursuant to the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 
which plays a critical part in national security investigations, is not available to state and 
local entities. For these reasons, state and local officials might play a critical, but 
supporting role in the counterterrorism effort. The coordination team could also be well 
placed to assess how federal and local actions impact identified communities. 
Likewise, fusion centers may also be presented as a logical integration point for 
this mission, but the existing status of fusion centers prohibits a counterterrorism mission 
in many cases; communication between fusion centers and a center of analysis is not 
currently established, and the challenge of measuring tangible benefits makes the mission 
politically infeasible to adequately fund from state and local treasuries. A holistic strategy 
will necessarily introduce the potential for competing interests and alternative resolutions 
for many circumstances. Through a unified command at regional levels, such conflicts 
can be resolved in a manner consistent with an overarching strategy. Such a networked 
structure might allow operations, information/propaganda, liaison intelligence, and 
analysis to be coordinated to maximum benefit. 
The problem of homegrown terrorism bears some commonality to a fight for 
“hearts and minds” in an insurgency, although there are significant differences as well. 
The United States does not face violent civil unrest, and therefore domestic 
counterterrorism efforts would logically be much less aggressive than in a COIN 
scenario. Similarly, only a very small portion of the indigenous population supports 
Islamic extremist ideology, and thus propaganda and “messaging” efforts would be 
commensurately constrained.  
Al Qaeda has declared a “war of ideas” against the United States (Abu ’Ubeid, 
2002). It is logical for the domestic intelligence community to engage on the same 
“battlefield.” Refusing to engage in the war of ideas is akin to surrendering this central 
element of the struggle. An understanding of the interpersonal nature of immigrant 
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Muslim cultures, their inherent distrust of domestic law enforcement and intelligence 
services due to cultural echoes from their nations of origin, and our own missteps in the 
wake of September 11, warrant an approach that addresses these issues from an 
ideological perspective. 
Additional research may result in more efficient application of counterterrorism 
resources, increase the effectiveness of the homeland security community, and develop a 
homeland security culture that enables concerted action by the government and the public 
to both prevent terrorist group formation and respond in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Literature: No overarching national strategy for counterterrorism or counter- 
radicalization exists. This research will consolidate pertinent information that may assist 
in developing counter-radicalization policies. This is important because, if the appeal of 
global jihadists is left unchecked, it will likely result in more radicalization in domestic 
populations. 
Future research efforts: This thesis will likely assist future research efforts of 
others because it will provide a starting point. The research conducted will support the 
evolution of domestic intelligence and law enforcement activity to a proactive model that 
engages the public.  
Immediate consumer/customer: The president of the United States, the secretary 
of the Department of Homeland Security, the director of the FBI, and the director of the 
National Counterterrorism Center are immediate consumers. This research will identify 
the benefits of a holistic strategy, as well as suggest new structures and policies to 
support the “long war.” 
Homeland security practitioners and national leaders: This research will present 
baseline information for further research and development of local and regional strategies 
to counter the long-term threat of terrorism. Potential benefits may include increased 




Since September 11, agencies conducting the counterterrorism mission in the 
United States have developed strategies independent of a national architecture and have 
favored enforcement action over “soft power” tactics (Nye, 2004). Alternative strategies 
have been and are being applied by other Western governments. In order to evaluate 
these alternative approaches against each other as well as against the status quo in the 
United States (i.e., an aggressive defense strategy), it is useful to identify a framework 
that might lead to a proactive strategy to mitigate the recruitment and radicalization of 
new terrorists. For purposes of this thesis, a comparative policy analysis will be 
conducted to identify best practices that might be applied in the United States. Each 
counterterrorism strategy will be analyzed using four parameters: 
1. Is the organizational structure of the counterterrorism effort aligned with 
the threat?  
2. Does the strategy ensure “unity of effort” across government agencies to 
prevent the development of terrorist cells? 
3. Does the strategy provide tools to shape the environment in which the 
ideological struggle is waged? 
4. Is the population’s social identity impacted by the government in a way 
that is positive or negative for national security? 
Academic research in the fields of history, security policy, political science, and 
military science, numerous studies by nongovernment agencies and think tanks, and 
public statements by government officials and official testimony provide a plethora of 
data relevant to the organizational structure of Western governments. Likewise, counter-
radicalization policies have been researched and discussed in several Western 
governments—in places like the United Kingdom and Australia, as well as in non-
Western nations like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Similar strategies have been employed 
through community policing programs for disadvantaged youth with positive and tangible 
results. Research in the social sciences defines the nature of group psychology and 
methods to impact interrelations at both the individual and organizational levels. And, 
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finally, the results of policies implemented by the United States and other countries to 
counter terrorism will speak to those efforts’ impact on government-public relationships. 
Beyond the published work described above, it may also be possible to interview current 
and former architects of U.S. counterterrorism strategies. These current and former 
officials may provide insight regarding alternatives that are politically feasible or might 
be applied at a later date—such as after the next dramatic terrorist attack on American 
soil or following the capture or death of Osama bin Laden. 
In order to improve the existing domestic counterterrorism policy, the following 
steps should be considered: 
1. A national counterterrorism doctrine should be developed that 
incorporates both short- and long-term tactics to counter terrorist activity 
and the development of new terrorists.  
2. Strategies should include “soft power” tactics to influence the social 
construct of targeted communities, continually assess new influences, and 
coordinate the actions of homeland security agencies in order to diminish 
the impact of radicalizing influences. 
3. Regional Outreach and Operational Coordination Centers (ROOCC) 
should be established to ensure a coordinated approach to disrupt violent 
extremism. ROOCCs must include representatives of federal, state, and 
local authorities who work together as a team to develop strategic partners 
outside the government and to coordinate hard- and soft-power activities 
of the government so that these efforts are complementary.. 
4. The president of the United States should issue an overarching 
counterterrorism strategy that includes provisions to mitigate the threat of 
homegrown terrorism through a unified command. 
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II. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY IN THE UNITED 
STATES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 
The art of choosing the right direction is also the art of creating new forces 
and new strength. 
-General Vo Nguyen Giap 
A. CURRENT THREAT 
There is consensus that the United States faces a terrorist that is fundamentally 
different from the threat prior to and in the years immediately following September 11, 
2001, but experts disagree about exactly what that means for national security (Sciolino 
& Schmidt, 2008). The media sometimes exaggerate disagreements regarding the nature 
of the threat, which in turn results in public debate related to the threat posed by al Qaeda 
and affiliate organizations. One side of the argument suggests that al Qaeda has survived 
the attempts of the United States to destroy or dismantle it and that al Qaeda continues to 
represent the principal but not the only threat to the United States. 
The other position posits that much of al Qaeda’s core leadership cadre has been 
captured or killed, and therefore the threat from the organization has been curtailed—
instead today’s threat is from relatively leaderless self-generating terrorist cells that 
operate independently of al Qaeda direction.3 If the former position is correct, the United 
States can expect a continuation of dramatic, internationally directed terrorist attacks that 
are sometimes years in planning, highly sophisticated, and strategically designed. The 
implication of the latter position is that the United States can expect isolated cells with 
relatively less capability to conduct attacks based on opportunity rather than a broader 
strategy. Merely a year ago, the threat posed by these “wannabe terrorists” was poorly 
understood and perhaps underestimated: 
Homegrown Muslim extremists who have little if any connection to 
known terrorist organizations have not launched a successful attack in the 
United States. The handful of homegrown extremists who have sought to 
                                                 
3 For a concise summary of the debate, see Hoffman’s review of Sageman’s book, Leaderless Jihad 
(2008).  
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strike within the Homeland since 9/11 have lacked the necessary tradecraft 
and capability to conduct or facilitate sophisticated attacks. (Leiter, 2009, 
p. 3) 
However, events during the past twelve months have altered the national threat 
assessment and raised the nation’s appreciation of a terrorist threat from both external 
and internal actors: 
During the past year our nation has dealt with the most significant 
developments in the terrorist threat to the homeland since 9/11.… The 
range of al Qaeda core affiliated, allied, and inspired US citizens and 
residents plotting against the Homeland … has become more complex and 
underscores the challenges of identifying and countering a more diverse 
range of Homeland plotting. (Leiter, 2010)  
Today’s threat therefore derives externally, from foreign powers like al Qaida and 
other terrorist groups, as well from some portion of the American population that 
identifies with and has proven susceptible to al Qaeda’s ideology. Americans should take 
little comfort in the fact that self-directed terrorists have not conducted sophisticated 
attacks in the homeland to this point—acts of domestic terrorism and spree killing in the 
United States during the last two decades vividly demonstrate that small self-radicalizing 
groups are very difficult to identify and have the capacity to conduct attacks that have 
devastating physical, social, and economic impact.4 
B. BALANCED POWER STRATEGIES 
The purpose of hard power is essentially to diminish the enemy’s ability to 
conduct physical attacks. The purpose of soft power is to stop the flow of new terrorist 
recruits. Neither tack alone is likely to mitigate conflict, but when exercised together, the 
odds of diminishing the terrorist threat are increased. According to many terrorism 
experts, such policies are mostly doomed to fail at truly preventing terrorism because 
they “only target those individuals whose identities have already been transformed” into 
 
                                                 
4 For instance, highly publicized violent attacks like the Oklahoma City bombing (1995 ), the 
Washington, D.C. sniper attacks (2002), and the Columbine school murders (1999) demonstrate the 
potential impact of “wannabe” and self-directed terrorists. It is likely that such acts, if conducted in a 
polarized social context by those subscribing to Islamist ideologies, might have an even more profound 
effect on society than previously experienced. 
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terrorists (Moghaddam, 2006 p. 127). Instead, a holistic approach—one that addresses the 
conditions that result in social polarization and in-group/out-group violence—is required 
to win an asymmetrical conflict. 
An historical review of terrorist groups supports this theory: terrorist groups were 
actually more likely to attain their goals than be destroyed when only coercive tactics 
were employed by the government. When political, intelligence, and policing strategies 
were employed, terrorist groups were much more likely to fail (Jones and Libicki, 2008). 
This suggests that stopping terrorist acts and diminishing the recruitment of new terrorists 
requires active engagement between the government and the American Muslim 
population. As noted by the 9/11 Commission, the United States should “engage in the 
struggle of ideas” (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p.375). 
Since 2001, the United States has not considered domestic applications of soft 
power. Instead, and by default, the United States has employed a counterterrorism 
strategy that leans almost exclusively toward hard power. This is likely the result of the 
lack of an overarching counterterrorism strategy. National Security Strategy 2010 (NSS 
2010) provides a catalyst to develop an overarching strategy. To engage in a battle of 
ideas, it is necessary to identify the threat. 
C. HOMEGROWN TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
The formal, organized threat from bin Laden and core al Qaeda has been severely 
diminished by military force abroad and through law enforcement in the homeland 
(Leiter, 2010a). But despite progress against al Qaeda, the Islamist narrative apparently 
remains in tact. Radicalization and polarization in the homeland are evidenced by the 
increasing numbers of radicalized individuals leaving the United States to fight in 
Islamist causes abroad, fourteen disrupted terrorist attacks in the last two years (Dilanian, 
2010), and Americans like Adam Gadahn in Pakistan and Abu Mansour al-Amriki in 
Somalia, who now serve leading roles for the al Qaeda and its affiliates. These 
developments are indicative of a long-term threat to national security. Political vitriol 
regarding the “Ground Zero Mosque” and the social divisions revealed through the 
proposed “Burn the Koran Day” in Gainesville, Florida, further indicate that the 
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polarization of American society may be on the increase. It appears that the battle of 
ideas5 promised by al Qaeda’s doctrine has proven its ideology more resilient than its 
core leadership. Today’s strategic threat is therefore not the short-term physical assault, 
but the social and ideological impact of polarized identities—the development, 
recruitment, and inspiration of new terrorists that might undermine the nation’s way of 
life, its civil liberties, and the way Americans go about their lives together. 
Measuring domestic radicalization is, of course, a difficult challenge because the 
term “radical” itself implies deviation from a baseline and is a relative term. “Violent 
extremists” and “terrorists” are likewise difficult numbers to quantify in the U.S. 
population because such individuals logically seek to operate clandestinely. It can, 
however, be judged that “radicalization” and homegrown terrorists are on the rise in the 
United States through anecdotal evidence. Some may assess that domestic radicalization 
in the United States lags behind that observed in other Western nations, but the 19 arrests 
associated with homegrown, “jihadist-inspired, terrorist plots by American citizens or 
legal permanent residents” (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010)6 between May, 2009 and August, 
2010 indicate that radicalization should be a major cause of concern. The increasing 
number of U.S. citizens who are joining (or attempting to join) the Islamist camp (Levitt 
& Jacobson, 2010) promises the threat of increased violent extremism associated with 
this cause. Examples of this radicalization in 2009 and 2010 include, but are not limited 
to:  
• American citizens departing the United States to fight with the al Qaeda-
associated al Shabaab in Somalia (Condon & Forliti, 2009); 
• Carlos Bledsoe of Little Rock, Arkansas, who murdered military recruiters 
in a drive-by shooting;  
                                                 
5 William Lind, the first to describe Fourth Generation Wars, articulated greatest concern for a form of 
warfare that combined terrorism, high technology, and the following additional elements: a nonnational or 
transnational base, such as an ideology or religion, a direct attack on the enemy's culture, and highly 
sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media, particularly television 
news. (Lind et al., (1989), pp. 22–26). These are the American military experts referred to by Abu Ubeid 
below). 
6 Appendix A of the referenced report provides a summary of each of the 40 post-September 11 
homegrown jihadist plots and attacks in chronological order. 
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• Najibullah Zazi of Denver, Colorado, who led a plot to attack New York 
City’s mass transit system;  
• Colleen R. LaRose, a.k.a "Jihad Jane" and Jamie Paulin Ramirez of 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Denver, Colorado, respectively, who 
conspired to kill a Swedish artist for drawing a picture of the prophet 
Mohammed’s head on the body of a dog;  
• Nidal Hasan, from Fort Hood, Texas, who is alleged to have murdered 
fellow soldiers as they underwent processing for deployment to Iraq; and 
•  Faisal Shahzad of Bridgeport, Connecticut, who attempted to explode a 
car bomb in New York City.  
The “immunity” of American Muslims to violent Islamist ideology has been 
demonstrably compromised. A recent summation of the terrorism threat goes directly at a 
concern for the “homegrown” threat:  
There is a spectrum of adversaries today arrayed against the United States. 
At the low end are individuals simply inspired to engage in terrorist 
attacks completely on their own.… But in other instances, terrorist groups 
either actively recruited individuals in the U.S., deliberately motivated 
others to carry out terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, or directed trained 
operatives in the execution of coordinated strikes against American targets 
within our borders. Al-Qaeda and its Pakistani, Somali, and Yemeni allies 
arguably have been able to accomplish the unthinkable—establishing at 
least an embryonic terrorist recruitment, radicalization, and operational 
infrastructure in the United States with effects both at home and abroad. 
And, by working through its local allies, the group has now allowed them 
to co-opt American citizens in the broader global al-Qaeda battlefield. 
(Bergen & Hoffman, 2010, p. 5)  
This evidence supports the proposition by Jonathan Paris, that the three most 
significant concerns to U.S. authorities should be: 
1. Converts to Islam who become extremist;  
2. Young American Muslims who travel abroad and meet AQ members or 
other extremists in Pakistan or the Middle East; and  
3. Radicalized Muslims who have been alienated by U.S. foreign policy. 
(Paris, 2007) 
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Why are these concerns “most significant”? Because they indicate that the violent 
Islamists have successfully influenced some American citizens to join the “global jihad,” 
despite diminishing support for al Qaeda around the globe (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
2008). These recent developments also indicate that surrendering the ideological 
battlefield by failing to engage in ideological conflict at home is a poor policy choice 
because “terrorism will continue to be a social problem, and civil society-level initiatives 
perhaps not previously considered in a serious way will ultimately warrant much greater 
consideration” (Horgan, 2006). 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
TERRORISM 
The Bush administration issued the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 
2003. Many, however suggest that this was not actually a strategy at all, but instead 
several disjointed ideas: “an approach to addressing a range of terrorist threats, a 
bureaucratic blueprint, a spending plan and a political statement” (Goure, 2004 p. 271). 
Succeeding plans by presidential administrations have likewise failed to take on the 
daunting political task of establishing a powerful central authority for the 
counterterrorism mission and have tended to look at the “battle of ideas” as an external 
conflict based principally on foreign-policy issues.  
National Security Strategy 2010 calls for the nation to approach the 
counterterrorism mission as a whole-government challenge (Obama Administration, 
2010, p.14), which reveals inherent challenges for the United States’ national security 
structure, and particularly the domestic counterterrorism effort: DHS (United States 
Department of Homeland Security [USDOH], 2008), NCTC (United States National 
Counterterrorism Center [USNCTC], 2010), and the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation 
[FBI], 2010) still all have legitimate claims to primacy in “protecting the United States 
from terrorism.”  
According to a recent strategic review, the United States faces a systemic 
challenge in that the “national security system is organized along functional lines 
(diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, etc.) with weak and cumbersome 
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integrating mechanisms across these functions.” (Locher, 2010.) None of these 
organizations incorporates domestic “counter-radicalization” into its mission statements. 
While these organizations do cooperate in preventing terrorist attacks, true collaboration 
and true prevention may be out of reach without a unified command and a holistic 
strategy.  
Looking to the future, it is important to note that the 9/11 Commission Report 
took only the federal government under its lens. This was appropriate at the time, 
considering the federal government’s responsibility to provide for the nation’s common 
defense, as set forth in the Constitution of the United States, because terrorist acts by 
foreign powers are fundamentally acts of war. For these reasons and because of the 
disparate structures that support the counterterrorism mission at state and local levels, 
only the main components of the federal counterterrorism apparatus will be summarized 
here. It should be noted, however, that the structure necessary to execute a national 
strategy will necessarily include state and local authorities, nongovernment and 
community organizations. The maturing domestic component of the terrorist threat will 
likely result in fundamental changes to the way that counterterrorism operations are 
defined and how the homeland security community fights terrorism. 
1. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established in August 2004 
and codified by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Masse, 
2005). NCTC was conceived and intended to address a key finding of the 9/11 
Commission: “Breaking the older mold of national government organizations, this NCTC 
should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by 
personnel from the various agencies.” (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 403). Reporting to 
both the president and the director of national intelligence (DNI), the NCTC is charged 
with a mission to “lead our nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by 
analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all 
instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.” Unfortunately, as a practical 
matter, NCTC is relegated to “suggesting” rather than “leading” the counterterrorism 
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effort because “neither the NCTC director nor the assistant to the president for homeland 
security and counterterrorism can direct departments and agencies, even on matters of CT 
programs and resources.” (Locher, 2010, p. 9) Nine years after 9/11, the need to consider 
both domestic radicalization and unity of effort raised concern for national leaders, who 
“expressed concern that no single U.S. agency is in charge of identifying and stopping the 
recruitment of U.S. citizens to carry out terrorist attacks” (Strohm, 2010) and “we have a 
lot of good people, a lot of good agencies [and] a lot of activity, but there still doesn’t 
seem to be an overall strategy nor accountability built in, nor a means of assessing the 
success” (Yager, 2010). 
2. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Since its 2002, the federal government has provided homeland security grant 
funding to be used for preventive measures, including the establishment of intelligence 
fusion centers (USDHS, 2009, p. 22). Fusion centers are state-administered joint 
intelligence centers where state, local, and federal agents work in close proximity to 
receive, integrate, and analyze information into a system that can benefit homeland 
security and counterterrorism programs at all levels. Federal agencies play a supporting 
rather than a lead role. Fusion centers are not standardized and have produced varying 
results. According to a report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), many of the 
centers identify “prevention of attacks” as a high priority, but little “true fusion” or 
analysis of disparate data sources, identification of intelligence gaps, or proactive 
collection of intelligence against those gaps, which could contribute to prevention, 
actually takes place (Rollins, 2008). 
The “FBI’s role in and support of individual fusion centers varies depending on 
the level of functionality of the fusion center and the interaction between the particular 
center and the local FBI field office” (General Accountability Office, 2009). Many 
Fusion centers are not part of an integrated national or regional network at all, and some 
do not even have FBI representatives assigned. These conditions frustrate the flow of 
information to both the national level and state and local policy makers—those who deal 
with the public as part of their daily responsibilities and who are thus best positioned to 
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spot and address circumstances that foment radicalization. DHS components participate 
at minimal levels in fusion centers, and this involvement is sometimes of limited value, 
due to the lack of secure compartmented intelligence facility space and accreditation that 
would allow them to process classified information. Until Fusion centers and their 
personnel have access to classified information, their practical effectiveness in the 
counterterrorism mission is likewise limited. This may be a contributing reason for an 
additional finding by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) that many of the centers 
initially had purely counterterrorism goals but have increasingly gravitated toward an all-
crime and even broader all-hazards approach. 
3. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
The FBI, in contrast to DHS, is highly centralized and centrally managed by the 
Counterterrorism Division (CTD), which is physically integrated with the NCTC. CTD is 
singularly responsible for all FBI counterterrorism operations nationwide; it fulfills this 
responsibility through joint terrorism task forces (JTTF). This centralization was 
instituted by Director Robert Mueller in the immediate aftermath of September 11 due to 
the widely held finding that FBI analytic and information-sharing failures contributed 
directly to the success of the Al Qaeda attacks (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 352). An 
immediate reaction to September 11, centralization was instituted to ensure control of 
operations and to increase information flow in an organization that had previously 
operated largely as 56 independent investigative agencies with limited information from 
other offices.  
Expansion of the number of the FBI’s joint terrorism task forces is, perhaps, the 
single most important accomplishment toward collaboration at federal and local levels. It 
is also provides a tangible measure of increased communication. The FBI has expanded 
the number of JTTFs from 33 in 2001 to more than 100 today (Mueller, 2010); they serve 
as the recognized and designated environment in which “federal to local operational 
partnerships” take place to detect, investigate, and disrupt terrorist threats or pursue 
perpetrators (Mines, 2007). The JTTFs historically have been guided by a national 
strategy that served as a “high level road map” encompassing the FBI counterterrorism 
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division’s mandate to “protect the United States from terrorist attack” (FBI, 2004). The 
FBI’s supporting national strategy, however, administratively expired in 2009. Since that 
time and due to an increased number of threat-driven scenarios, the FBI’s 
counterterrorism mission has become “reactive.” The CTD and the JTTFs are forced to 
respond quickly to a variety of eminent threats outside the construct of a long-range plan 
or strategic vision.  
JTTFs do not have authority or a formal mechanism to disseminate information 
beyond participants in the task force. In the event of an overseas terrorist attack, state and 
local participant agencies often seek information regarding ongoing developments or 
“spot reporting” that is perceived to be available to JTTFs. Often such information is not 
available, and in other cases the information may be in a classified format that requires 
limited distribution. This has been the basis of comments from the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police that “the full benefits of intelligence sharing have not yet 
been realized because the process itself remains a mystery to many police officers, and 
some law enforcement executives consider their agencies too small or too remote to 
participate in criminal intelligence sharing. These obstacles to full participation could 
result in alarming gaps in the intelligence that guides our homeland security and crime 
fighting efforts” (International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], 2008). 
JTTFs collect information through a variety of means, including technical and 
human intelligence, but they enjoy only limited analytical capability for counterterrorism 
matters in support of local and regional issues or threats because intelligence collection 
priorities are generally related to foreign-focused national intelligence requirements, not 
societal factors that influence domestic radicalization. Local officials sometimes benefit 
from JTTF intelligence, but they rarely receive products that contribute to local policy 
decisions. This may be part of the reason that some SLT organizations do not readily 
appreciate the value of JTTF participation. A 2008 survey of the International Chiefs of 
Police reinforces this point: its members concluded that the national counterterrorism 
strategy was developed “without sufficiently seeking or incorporating the advice, 
expertise or consent of public safety officials” at the state, local, and tribal level (Leavell, 
2007, p. 45). 
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The FBI has also established field intelligence groups (FIGs), consisting of FBI 
agents, linguists, surveillance specialists, and analysts at every field division (National 
Strategy for Information Sharing, 2002, p. 8). FIGs focus on cross-programmatic and all-
source intelligence production and dissemination. According to FBI Director Mueller, 
FIGs have come to regularly share this intelligence with FBI partners in more than 
18,000 law enforcement agencies around the country. They collaborate closely with 
international counterparts and recognize the imperative to be able to develop and 
disseminate information that will assist our partners (Mueller, 2008). Despite these 
accomplishments, it is not entirely clear that the FBI’s homeland partners feel that they 
receive sufficient intelligence and analysis to enable effective homeland security 
operations (West & Bykowicz, 2010). For this reason, many state and some local 
agencies have created and come to rely on their own intelligence centers that are not fully 
integrated into either a federal or national counterterrorism mission. Uncoordinated 
intelligence activities sometimes result in operational compromise and limit potential 
intelligence collection and, ultimately, the prevention of future attacks (Dwyer, 2009). 
E. CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY THE CURRENT STRUCTURE 
The structure of the nation’s counterterrorism effort confounds even the most 
dedicated efforts at a “whole government approach,” not because of an unwillingness or 
due to technical challenges to sharing information but because there is no unity of 
command for the counterterrorism mission. While NCTC is responsible for “monitoring 
and assessing overall National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP) 
implementation, as well as the impact of subordinate CT plans and guidance” (Leiter, 
2009), it is not clear that subordinate counterterrorism strategies matriculate from the 
NIP, and NCTC is not currently positioned to enforce its monitoring role. 
Outside of Washington, the United States has two basic structures though which 
the counterterrorism mission is addressed: The DHS and the FBI function at both ends of 
the organizational spectrum. DHS lacks both interconnectivity with its fusion centers and 
direct authority over resources that are “owned” by state and local agencies. The 
department is charged with 
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assisting state, local and private sector entities in disrupting potential 
terrorist activity and denying terrorists access to the United States at our 
land, air and sea ports of entry, as well as travel networks into and within 
the country.… [However, despite DHS’s role as] one of the Federal 
government’s key counterterrorism agencies, beyond the Secretary and 
Deputy Secretary, DHS did not have a single coordinating entity for 
counterterrorism activities. (USDHS, 2010)  
This may seem a confusing alignment of resources to mission—in fact the overlap 
of agency responsibilities and missions results in a fundamental challenge to effective 
and efficient prosecution of the homeland security mission (Bellavita, 2008). Instead of 
an integrated structure, the homeland security community has several separate structures 
that are not interlinked, a reflection of the amorphous nature of the current homeland 
security environment. Further complicating the homeland security challenge, until the 
publication of National Security Strategy 2010 in April 2010, the counterterrorism 
community faced the dynamic nature and complexity of terrorism threats with no 
overarching strategy, multiple definitions of the homeland security mission (Bellavita, 
2008), and overlapping jurisdictions that can cause internecine rivalries, impede 
information sharing, and reduce efficiency. At the operational level, lack of clearly 
defined roles and missions creates confusion, provides no mechanism for resolution, and 
can result in missed opportunities to collect intelligence or exploit operational 
opportunities. 
F. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY AND THE DISRUPTION OF 
DEVELOPED THREATS 
The basis for counterterrorism policy in the United States can be found in the 
United States legal code, where terrorism is defined as: “activities [that] (A) involve 
violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the 
United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within 
the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) and appear to be intended to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping” (18 U.S.C. § 2331, 2010).  
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National Security Strategy 2010 acknowledges the growing threat of 
“homegrown” terrorism (Obama Administration, 2010, p.19) and is the first strategy to 
include homeland security as part of a broader national security effort (Tapper, 2010). 
This reflects an aspect of the 9/11 Commission report that had not previously been 
implemented in the homeland: “Prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism” 
(Kean & Hamilton, 2004). How NSS 2010 will be implemented, however, remains to be 
seen. 
The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice play leading 
roles in preventing terrorism through law enforcement action and intelligence collection. 
Both remain in a degree of flux as they strive to address the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission. The organizations share overlapping missions,7 and both agencies have 
devoted resources and personnel to expand existing or to create new organizational 
structures designed to increase communication and cooperation with state and local 
agencies in support of the counterterrorism mission. These efforts have had varying 
degrees of success. 
John Brennan, the assistant to the president for homeland security and 
counterterrorism under President Barack Obama, recently assessed the current homeland 
security atmosphere, saying:  
In the years since [the terrorist attacks of September 11], I have seen the 
significant progress made in safeguarding the American people—
unprecedented coordination and information sharing between federal 
agencies and with state and local governments; improved security at our 
borders and ports of entry; disruption of terrorist recruitment and 
financing; and a degradation of al Qaeda’s ability to plan and execute 
attacks.” (Brennan & Flanagan, 2009) 
                                                 
7 The U.S. government struggled with how to best accommodate the desire for clear authority for the 
Department of Homeland Security. The Homeland Security Council was formed with this intent in mind 
(HSPD-1). When it was created, the Department of Homeland Security had three core components to its 
mission statement: “Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; Reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” Likewise, the FBI’s mission 
is “to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and 
enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to 
federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.” These overlapping missions contribute to 
the confusion of responsibilities in domestic counterterrorism matters.  
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This commentary by a senior representative of a presidential administration (that, 
like most administrations, might be disinclined to compliment the accomplishments of its 
predecessor) speaks highly of the progress made by the homeland security community. It 
is widely accepted that the nation’s security posture is improved relative to the status of 
homeland security prior to September 11. Why? 
The sense that the homeland security community is moving in the correct 
direction is largely determined by evaluating critical mission areas. The Department of 
Homeland Security defines its strategic objectives:  
• Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 
• Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and 
• Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. (National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002) 
The FBI defines its strategic objectives for the counterterrorism mission: 
• Prevent terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests; 
• Deny terrorists and their supporters the capacity to plan, organize, and 
carry out logistical, operational, and support activities; 
• Pursue appropriate sanctions against terrorists and their supporters; 
• Provide incident response and investigative capability [investigation and 
intelligence]; and 
• Identify and respond to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats and 
fully coordinate the investigative response of the U.S. government to a 
WMD threat or attack. (FBI, 2004). 
Employing the above criteria, the fact that no major terrorism acts have occurred 
in the United States since 2001 and that several terrorist groups have been disrupted 
during the same period may indicate that the mission has generally been addressed by the 
DHS and the FBI in a manner sufficient to counter existing threats. It may, however, also 
indicate that no sophisticated attacks have been attempted or that al Qaeda’s strategy has 
changed to capitalize on American recruits with little training or experience—such 
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attacks are less expensive in terms of time, resources, and risk than pre-September 11 al 
Qaeda operations that were planned for years prior to the attack. 
But, being informed is only part of the challenge. Devising and implementing a 
holistic counter-radicalization strategy would necessarily include more than just federal 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies: community leaders, corporate partners, and 
nongovernment agencies should be integrated into such strategies. The U.S. government 
has not broached this challenge in a serious way. NSS 2010 could mark a significant shift 
in domestic policy—certainly, the roles and activities of counterterrorism agencies may 
change with a new counter-radicalization mission that none has previously embraced.  
It is important for the president and highest-level policy makers to consider a 
philosophical question: Does the United States face a greater threat from the few hundred 
al Qaeda members in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan—and their affiliates, or 
from the threat of social polarization and the violence inspired by radical Islamist 
ideology? If, as NSS 2010 suggests, “We are at war with a specific network, al-Qa’ida, 
and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies, and 
partners” (Obama Administration, 2010, p.20) then a sustained “hunt and kill or capture” 
policy may suffice. This statement, however, seems to conflict with current depictions of 
the present state of the terrorist threat, as provided by certain officials. The director of the 
National Counterterrorism Center has stated, “Plots disrupted in [the domestic United 
States] during the past year were unrelated operationally, but are indicative of a collective 
subculture and a common cause that rallies independent extremists to want to attack the 
Homeland” (Leiter, 2010b). According to the director of the FBI, “threats from 
homegrown violent extremists … who act without direction from a foreign terrorist 
organization—remain a concern” ( Mueller, 2010). The secretary of DHS has stated, “It 
is clear that the threat of al Qaeda-style terrorism is not limited to the al-Qaeda core 
group, or organizations that have close operational links to al Qaeda” (Napolitano, 2010). 
After all, the formal, organized threat from bin Laden and core al Qaeda has been 
severely diminished by military force abroad and through law enforcement in the 
homeland (Leiter, 2010a).  
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Conversely, despite progress against core al Qaeda and affiliated groups, the 
Islamist narrative apparently remains intact and has penetrated American society. “Last 
year was a watershed in terrorist attacks and plots in the United States, with a record total 
of 11 jihadist attacks, jihadist-inspired plots, or efforts by Americans to travel overseas to 
obtain terrorist training” (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010). It appears that the battle of ideas8 
promised by al Qaeda’s doctrine has proven its ideology more resilient than its core 
leadership. 
Certainly the quantitative impact of American deaths caused by terrorism within 
the nation’s borders during 2010 does not compare to 2001, but the number of attacks has 
been multiplied tenfold. Today’s domestic threat from militant Islam is not the short-term 
impact of a dramatic physical assault, but the social and ideological impact of polarized 
identities that might divide the nation and directly affect our way of life if a cycle of 
religious and ethnic violence materializes. In addition to the prominence of Americans 
who have become leaders of al Qaeda and some of its affiliate organizations, al Qaeda 
engages in propaganda that undermines the status and credibility of the United States. 
American citizens with strong familial and ethnic ties in Pakistan, for instance, might be 
susceptible to efforts by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who claimed that America, via its 
influence with the government of Pakistan, actively prevented aid to flow to the victims 
of flooding in Pakistan (al-Zawahiri, 2010). Zawahiri’s statement, of course, is true in the 
sense that al Qaeda members are actively targeted by United States and Pakistani 
government forces. Zawahiri’s message, however, was not adequately countered, or 
better yet preempted, by broad messaging by the United States regarding efforts by the 
American military, Department of State, and nongovernment and charitable organizations 
that mobilized to deliver aid. Ideologically, this was an opportunity lost. Instead of 
messages regarding efforts to deliver aid to Muslims abroad, the Muslim-American 
public was inundated by media coverage of the “Ground Zero Mosque” and “burn the 
Koran Day.” 
                                                 
8 William Lind, the first to describe Fourth Generation Wars, articulated greatest concern for a form of 
warfare that combined terrorism, high technology, and the following additional elements: a nonnational or 
transnational base, such as an ideology or religion; a direct attack on the enemy's culture, and highly 
sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media, particularly television 
news. (Lind, 1989, pp. 22–26). These are the American military experts referred to by Abu Ubeid below). 
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G. SUMMARY OF THE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORT 
Since September 11, agencies conducting the counterterrorism mission in the 
United States have developed strategies independent of a national architecture and have 
favored enforcement action over “soft power” tactics (Nye, 2004). Alternative strategies 
have been and are being applied by other Western governments with success. Chief 
among these nations are the United Kingdom—perhaps the country most experienced in 
combating insurgency and homegrown terrorism—and the Netherlands—one of the 
West’s most liberal nations. The United States should evaluate these alternative 
approaches to identify a framework that recognizes the common principles that mitigate 
the recruitment and radicalization of new terrorists. For the purposes of this thesis, a 
comparative policy analysis will be conducted to identify best practices that might be 
applied in the United States. Each counterterrorism strategy will be analyzed using four 
parameters: 
1. Is the organizational structure of the counterterrorism effort aligned with 
the threat?  
2. Does the strategy ensure unity of effort across government agencies to 
prevent the development of terrorist cells? 
3. Does the strategy provide tools to shape the environment in which the 
ideological struggle is waged? 
4. Is the population’s social identity impacted by the government in a way 
that is positive or negative for national security? 
Answering these questions may define a strategy designed to impact not just the 
enemy but also to have a far-reaching social impact.  
As suggested by NSS 2010, a whole government strategy can have profound 
implications for our national security and improve our way of life. Placed in an 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF A COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The test we must set for ourselves is not to march alone but to march in 
such a way that others will wish to join us. 
-Hubert Humphrey, U.S. Vice President, Senator 
A. THE BASIS OF THE UK STRATEGY 
1. The UK Experience with Homegrown Terrorism in Northern Ireland 
While the history of the Irish-British conflict dates from the Norman Conquest of 
1066 C.E., the scope of this analysis will relate to the conflict pursued by the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA), commonly referred to as the “Troubles” that began in 
1969. Before considering government action, it is first necessary to provide the context of 
the conflict and explore the nature of the PIRA. 
The PIRA is an outgrowth of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) that fought an 
insurgency successfully challenging British rule in the whole of Ireland. The IRA conflict 
was essentially an asymmetrical military conflict that began with the Easter rebellion of 
1916–1921. The British in turn, employed “tactics, including martial law, cordon and 
search operations;” the use of IRA prisoners as hostages on high-risk patrols; rigid media 
control; even firing squads. These tactics succeeded tactically but ultimately caused 
resentment from the Catholic population. The UK’s heavy-handed tactics diminished its 
popular support and the government’s credibility with a population that, from its 
perspective, had been repressed by the Crown for hundreds of years. The UK’s 
“retaliation policy” ultimately undermined popular support to the point that the UK was 
compelled to sign a treaty that partitioned Ireland into the Republic of Ireland, a 
predominately Catholic population that achieved self-rule, and a British province in the 
north where the majority population was Protestant (Geraghty, 1998, pp. 330–42). As a 
result of the partition, the six northernmost counties became what is now known as the 
Province of Northern Ireland (Gregory, 2010). 
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The “Irish victory” resonated in Irish social identity and served as a siren song for 
a hard-core element within the Irish “republican” movement that opposed the partition of 
Ireland, despite a majority of the population (loyalists) in the six counties of the north that 
chose to remain a part of the United Kingdom. IRA continued to seek unification of 
Ireland’s 32 counties into a single state—their preferred strategy to accomplish 
unification was to oust the local Ulster government and the British Army through the use 
of terrorism. 
But conflict in Northern Ireland would not be driven solely by a small group of 
individuals seeking control of the whole of Ireland—there were other underlying factors 
resulting from the partition that also contributed to social unrest. Catholics in Ulster were 
subject to discrimination and maltreatment by the loyalist Protestant population. 
Legitimate social grievances created a context where Catholics progressed along a path 
toward political violence. These circumstances lay mostly below the surface until after 
World War II and the rise of civil protest that permeated Western society in the 1960s. 
In 1968, Catholic perceptions of discrimination resulted in a campaign of mass 
civil rights protests that attracted international attention to the cause of the Irish 
Catholics. The government of Northern Ireland attempted to address some of the 
grievances but with little real impact; polarization of the society had already occurred, 
and it persisted. The police service of Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC) misread the motivation of civil rights protesters, thinking they were led by 
republicanism. The RUC assessed the civil disobedience as veiled separatism, when in 
fact the civil rights protests were simply that—protests regarding discrimination. The 
government of Northern Ireland conceded to some grievances of the “Catholic 
community living in poverty following decades of neglect.… [Unfortunately,] these 
concessions sparked fears in Loyalist areas about the future of the link with Britain.” 
(Jane’s Provisional PIRA, 2010). Catholic protest expanded in 1968 and 1969 and was 
met by a repressive Ulster government. The RUC responded to civil-rights marchers 
engaged in civil disobedience with violent crackdowns. After days of violent rioting. and 
with the RUC forces exhausted. “Britain deployed regular army troops to the province's  
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streets, ostensibly to protect the Catholic minority” (Gregory, 2010). Unaddressed 
grievances and fears on both sides of the dispute would fuel violence from that time 
forward and mark the establishment of the PIRA. 
Some former members of the IRA, and new recruits generated from the Ulster 
government’s response to civil rights protests, supported violence as a means to 
independence for all 32 counties of Ireland. This nucleus formed the PIRA and split from 
the republican movement, leaving behind the old “official” IRA, that was “more 
interested in exploring the political, socialist path than continuing with the armed 
struggle” (Alonso, 2001, p. 133).  
The British army deployed to an unenviable position: directly in the middle of 
sectarian violence. Both sides of the Republican-loyalist conflict used terrorism and 
intimidation tactics, although the PIRA was far more active and potent with its terrorist 
attacks and a historical reference that framed the British army as an occupying force. 
Considering the level and nature of violence employed by both sides of the conflict, it is 
easy to understand the aggressive posture taken by the British army in its conduct of the 
mission. Two factors likely drove military actions: 1) the violence and intimidation 
perpetrated by the PIRA obligated the United Kingdom to provide security for its citizens 
and 2) due at least in part to its heavy-handed tactics, the RUC had been unable to 
develop an effective intelligence that might allow for a more refined approach. For these 
reasons, the British government retaliated against attacks and used coercive techniques to 
develop information about the terrorism group.  
The 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA) established special 
criminal processes that included broad search and seizure authority, warrantless arrests, 
and detention without trial. The Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 
(PVA) expired in 1973 but was reintroduced following a spate of bombings in 1974 as 
the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA). Under these laws 
“preventative detention was allowed for 48 hours without a warrant, and an additional 




measures allowed the British to disrupt terrorist attacks, but mass arrests without charges 
adversely affected the relationship between the government and Catholic citizens of 
Northern Ireland. 
The PIRA then embarked on a campaign of dramatic violence that it claimed 
targeted the British and Dublin governments but regularly resulted in civilian deaths. The 
two cases below represent a small sample of the 2,671 attacks committed by the PIRA 
and its affiliates between 1970 and 1998, as well as PIRA’s obvious disregard for 
innocent life (Global Terrorism Database, 2010):  
• On July 21, 1972, the IRA’s Belfast Brigade planted 26 bombs in the city 
center without prior warning. Eleven people died, and more than 100 were 
injured. This attack became known as “Bloody Friday.” 
• On November 21, 1974, the IRA planted explosive devices in several pubs 
in Birmingham, on the British mainland. A total of 21 people were killed, 
and over 100 were injured. This expanded terrorist operations outside 
Northern Ireland and created a new paradigm for British security services. 
a. Internal Review and Adjustments 
By 1975, it became evident to the UK that a new strategy would be 
required for such a long conflict that had produced multiple generations who viewed the 
British government as an occupying power. The UK adopted elements of “hearts and 
minds” campaigns that had been successfully employed in counterinsurgencies in Malaya 
and Kenya to refine its approach to counter terrorist activity at home. The strategy 
combined forensic police investigation with massive surveillance of terrorist suspects. 
The new domestic counterterrorism strategy substituted massive physical, human, and 
electronic surveillance for physical separation (Geraghty, 1998, p.74). The UK also 
began to treat terrorism as a crime, rather than an act of war, and adopted an approach 




With the PVA and PTA in effect, the UK continuously reviewed the 
application of counterterrorism strategies and corresponding laws to gauge efficacy and 
identify operational gaps and necessary changes. For instance, in 1983, laws were 
changed to address “exclusion” and the deportation of travelers to and within the UK 
(Walker, 1983, p. 489) as a way to preclude radicalizing influences and operational cells 
from entering England. The regular and objective review of policy revealed further gaps 
in the UK strategy, such as threats from external locals (i.e., Irish visiting England), and 
enabled the creation and enforcement of laws that diminished the PIRA’s ability to attack 
in England. The British excluded travelers to the UK who were associated with terrorists. 
These tactics aligned with the counterinsurgency concept of separating terrorists from the 
mass population in order to protect citizens and deny the terrorists opportunities to recruit 
or raise funds. 
The “criminalization” of terrorism lent credibility to the UK government’s 
actions because of the transparent legal process and the government’s more restrained 
enforcement of laws intended to counter the persistent threat to civilians. From the 
perspective of those sympathetic to the PIRA, the UK continued its punitive and deterrent 
strategies that squelched the freedom to express opposition to ruling governments on 
either side of the partition in a constructive way. With Ireland politically divided and the 
Northern Irish economy tattered, root causes of the conflict and societal unrest were 
unable to be constructively communicated by the Catholics in Northern Ireland, much 
less addressed by the Ulster government, in a way that might increase the public’s trust 
and loyalty. Resistance to British rule remained high in some segments of the society. 
The terrorists clung to their vision of an Ireland united through violent ousting of the 
British and to claims made by their leadership cadre: “Armed struggle is a necessary and 
morally correct form of resistance in the six counties against a government whose 
presence is rejected by the vast majority of the Irish people (O’Brien, 1999, p. 116). But 
the narrative had been countered by British actions, and illusions of strong support for the 
PIRA proved false. 
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b. Government Influence Increased 
Nevertheless, the PIRA’s bombing campaign continued on its spiraling 
tangent of indiscriminant violence. Indiscriminate targeting - and the fact that the PIRA 
and its affiliates killed more Catholics than the British security services, the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary, and Protestant terrorist groups combined—thus undermined the message it 
sought to communicate. With civilian death tolls increased, the IRA lost its moral appeal 
with the mass population and with it lost public support.  
Contrastingly, the Crown gained credibility by demonstrating interest in 
resolving the conflict, and it increased investment in infrastructure and the economy. 
Shifting public sentiment brought with it enhanced cooperation from the public and the 
enhanced ability to elicit volunteered information from the public and recruitment of 
informants. It is now clear that “some very centrally placed republicans” were enlisted to 
that end (Dickson, 2009, p. 487), which in turn resulted in better intelligence.  
The British adopted a holistic approach to address grievances that was 
meant to require contributions from both the Unionists and the Catholic minority’s 
leadership. After three decades of violence, with all sides bloodied, Protestant, Catholic, 
and British government all longed for peace. In order to get what they wanted, the 
government and the population were compelled to work together to maximize mutual 
benefit. The British strategy to accomplish this was particularly important because, as 
some analysts contend, “the biggest problem [uniting Northern Ireland] was the lack of 
trust between the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein (Archick, 2008, p. 3).  
The Irish population began to see two ideologies emerge. One offered 
hope for peaceful coexistence, a path to independence, and improved quality of life. The 
other promised continued violence and indiscriminate killing. 
c. Impact 
As support for violence diminished, the political branch of the PIRA, Sinn 
Fein, found influence, but British execution of the UK counterterrorism strategy had 
already gained traction: 
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PIRA support came from elements within Ireland’s Catholic population.… 
At the peak of its campaign in the 1970s and 1980s the group enjoyed 
considerable support from these communities, and this was reflected in the 
fact that, following the end of the conflict, Sinn Féin became the largest 
party on the nationalist/republican side in the Northern Ireland Assembly 
following the March 2007 elections. However, while successful in 
appealing to sections of Northern Ireland’s Catholic community, the party 
failed to make the breakthrough in Republic of Ireland politics that it had 
hoped for. In the 2007 general election, Sinn Féin was returned with only 
four of the 166 seats in the Dail (parliament). As such, despite the fact that 
PIRA purported to conduct its armed campaign in the name of the Irish 
people, the vast majority of people on the island of Ireland, north and 
south, voted for parties that rejected the violence of PIRA, an illegal 
organization in both jurisdictions. (Jane’s Provisional IRA, 2010) 
The PIRA splintered repeatedly as dissident factions who refused to 
reconcile left the group, but eventually the Good Friday peace agreement was signed on 
April 10, 1998. The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of power 
from London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland assembly and executive committee in 
which Unionist and nationalist parties would share power, as well as a commitment by 
PIRA to disarm.  
Shortly after the Good Friday Agreements, on August 15, 1998,  
29 people were killed by a car bomb planted in the packed town center of 
Omagh. The attack was claimed by the “Real IRA … a non-reformist 
republicanism that finds its legitimization in … the use of force as the 
main and uncompromising method to achieve [its] republican goals … a 
“necessary form of resistance”, also provides them with the “right to 
murder in the name of Ireland.” 
Omagh’s atrocity was followed by Gerry Adams’s first … condemnation 
of an attack carried out by republican activists. In the last three decades 
the IRA had perpetrated similar actions, though none of them had ever 
been condemned by any of its leaders. (Alonso, 2001) 
Though atrocities may still occasionally occur, the UK’s principled and 
legal actions in the fight against terrorism contrast so sharply with the terrorists’ portrayal 
of themselves as warriors fighting an occupying force that even Gerry Adams, a 30-year 
PIRA veteran and suspected member of the Provisional Army Council finally denounced 
republican violence. Adams, who had already emerged as a political leader of the PIRA 
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at the time of his statement, may have had ulterior motives for doing so—the Omagh 
attack may have been intended to undermine his power and authority within PIRA or may 
have been an attempt by a splinter faction to win influence with those who were 
convinced that continued violence was in their best interest. This in-group/out-group 
dynamic signaled that while the mass Catholic population had become “de-radicalized,” 
peaceful harmony in Northern Ireland might linger out of reach. 
The UK government’s willingness to address legitimate grievances of the 
population proved beneficial, especially as tensions linger between Irish republicans and 
the majority Protestants in Northern Ireland. Soft power tactics allowed—or 
encouraged—a leader like Gerry Adams, the same IRA terrorist leader cited above, to 
engage in negotiations with the British government and the government in Ulster. Adams 
described why the new British policy was effective: “In the past I have defended the right 
of the IRA to engage in armed struggle… Now there is an alternative” (Time (Verbatim), 
2005). Where the terrorists’ message had promised continuing violence, the UK instead 
offered hope and opportunity. Successful application of the UK strategy countered the 
terrorists’ ideological narrative, though it did not offer a panacea.  
The troubles in Ireland continue at a subdued rate, with occasional spikes 
in activity from dissident republicans that cost lives—even today. Nevertheless, the 
government has met its principle goal for the threat posed by terrorism. The risk of Irish 
terrorism has been “reduced sufficiently so that people can go about their lives freely and 
with confidence” (UK, Home Office, 2009). 
2. UK Experience with Islamic Extremism 
a. Current Threat 
The UK faces a complex challenge when it comes to international 
terrorism. On one hand, it has been engaged in a conflict with one of the world’s most 
sophisticated and long-lasting terrorist organizations, the PIRA, and its offshoots since 
1969. More recently, a threat from al Qaeda and like-minded Islamic terrorists reached 
British shores. With the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, the threat increased exponentially. 
As provided by the former head of MI5, the UK “involvement in Iraq radicalized a whole 
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generation of young people who saw [the UK’s] role in Iraq and Afghanistan as an attack 
on Islam” (Hughes, 2010). The UK’s close alignment with the United States changed 
Britain’s status in the “global jihad” from support base to target.  
The global jihadist threat emanates both from terrorists who are guided by 
core al Qaida leadership and self-radicalizing actors who are “autonomous and take their 
lead from radical propaganda shared via the internet and other channels.” MI5 assesses 
that Islamic terrorists draw their inspiration from al Qaeda’s global message: the West 
represents a threat to Islam; loyalty to religion and democratic institutions is impossible; 
and violence is the only proper response (MI5, 2010).  
So why does the narrative appeal to British Muslims? To try and 
understand the context in the UK, it is useful to understand the context of Muslim-
majority relations in spring-of-2001 Britain. During that period, “spasmodic rioting 
skipped between towns in the north of England, … white and Asian youths fought each 
other and the police. In Bradford, cars were torched, businesses were firebombed and, on 
July 7th alone, 164 police officers were injured” (Economist, 2001).  
The Islamist ideology may resonate with some British Muslims because 
many perceive themselves as a disadvantaged minority. In fact, this perception is 
supported by socioeconomic metrics: Muslims in the UK are the least likely of religious 
groups to own their own homes, least likely to hold professional jobs, and the most likely 
to be out of work (Economist, 2005). But socioeconomic motivations alone have not 
proven to be a key indicator for radicalization (Victoroff, 2005, p. 3–42).  
Many of the UK’s immigrant Muslims relocated to the UK from regions 
of conflict (particularly Kashmir) where tribal and clan affiliations had great influence on 
daily life and social norms. For instance, most women in Muslim countries do not work 
outside the home. In the UK, where the cost of living is very high and most women do 
work outside the home, the cultural proclivity for a wife to remain at home reduces the 
household income below the average. A similar pattern emerges when one considers that 
the average number of children born to Muslims in the Europe is three times that of non-
Muslims (Taspınar, 2003). 
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Reasons for polarization can be complex. For instance, Gallup polling data 
of London Muslims indicated that they were “less likely than the general public to say 
they would prefer to live in a neighborhood made up mostly of people who share their 
religious or ethnic background (25% vs. 35%)” (Mogahed, 2007). But complicating this 
articulated desire, for many Muslim immigrants cultural tradition and economic 
conditions might call for multiple generations to live in the same home. The physical 
structure of housing configuration in the UK makes such arrangements difficult. The 
obvious alternative for children is to buy a home close to other family members. This 
course of action seems to resolve the cultural inclination, but to other British citizens in 
the neighborhood, it might appear that the immigrant population is buying up local 
properties with intent to form a political block. The failure of individuals to engage can 
cause social polarization because of such misunderstandings—similar to the 
circumstances of Catholic civil rights protests in Ireland in 1969. Understanding the 
relationship between demographic data and the “true” situation is crucial to a thorough 
understanding of social contexts.  
British Muslims were also emotionally impacted by UK military actions 
against coreligionists and extended family abroad. For these reasons, some British 
Muslims suffered the predictable outcomes of these circumstances—cognitive dissonance 
and crisis of identity. The result has been  increased domestic radicalization.  
Regardless of the reasons behind the perception, much of Britain’s 
Muslim population felt alienated from the majority population in the UK due to their 
ethnicity and religious beliefs (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2008). This circumstance is 
one that the British government must deal with effectively to prevent social polarization 
over the long term. 
b. Strategic Assessment 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the UK government focused on the 
“Troubles” and Irish terrorism. But by 2003, the UK recognized that the threat of Islamist 
ideology represented not just a threat from abroad but also from the British Muslim 
population that maintained familial and ideological links to Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
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Pakistan where the UK and its allies were engaged in military operations. Facing the 
prospect of internal political, religious, and ethnic conflict, the British government 
devised a “long-war” strategy for the new threat, a balanced approach that incorporates 
both hard and soft power: aggressive military action and policing to disrupt terrorist 
operations, paired with engagement strategies designed to stop the flow of new recruits 
and cut off support for terrorist organizations. The holistic strategy to counter terrorism 
was titled “CONTEST.”  
The British security services have recognized that the “new terrorism” 
contrasts sharply with the Irish threat and that threats emanating from global Islamist 
ideology continue to evolve (Roseneau et al., 2007). Al Qaeda and other international 
terrorist networks are a very serious threat and likely to persist for a considerable time in 
the future. Where the Irish pursued a limited and defined political agenda, al Qaeda and 
similarly motivated groups are “global in origin, global in ambition and global in reach 
… [with] an ambition to kill as many people as possible” (O’Neill, 2006).  
In the spring of 2001, concerned with the obvious risk of escalating 
violence between races, an investigation was commissioned by the Home Office. Social 
conditions that contributed to the riots were apparent to Ted Cantle, the man charged with 
assessing what the causes might be: 
Whilst the physical segregation of housing estates and inner city areas 
came as no surprise, the team was particularly struck by the depth of 
polarisation of our towns and cities. The extent to which these physical 
divisions were compounded by so many other aspects of our daily lives, 
was very evident. Separate educational arrangements, community and 
voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and 
cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a 
series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, 
let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges. (Cantle, 2001, 
p.9) 
The underlying polarization of British society raised the possibility of 
continuing violence, in direct parallel to the polarization between Protestants and 
Catholics in Northern Ireland thirty years before. The events of September 11, 2001, and 
the allied invasion of Iraq would contribute further to polarization—but it is important to 
  46
understand that the threat to the UK runs more deeply than a terrorist attack. Underlying 
social conditions were only exacerbated by UK support for American military campaigns. 
Thus, the UK set out to address the threat to its national security on multiple fronts with a 
new strategy. 
B. CURRENT STRATEGY 
In order to explain the UK’s current strategy for countering terrorism, it is useful 
consider its definition of “terrorism.” In 2000, the UK adopted a definition that clearly 
identifies both religion and ideology as potential components of a terrorist act. The UK 
defines terrorism as: “the use or threatened use of violence, designed to influence the 
government or an international governmental organization or to intimidate the public or a 
section of the public for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause” (UK Home Office, 2006). This definition sets the table for broad measures to 
address the roots of terrorism outside the sphere of political agendas; it opens the door to 
government inquiry into religion and ideology.  
The CONTEST strategy is arranged into five components: 1) pursue: i.e., 
stopping terrorist attacks; 2) prevent: i.e., stopping people from becoming terrorists or 
supporting violent extremism; 3) protect: i.e., strengthening protection against attack; 4) 
prepare: i.e., mitigating the impact of attacks; and 5) counter proliferation (UK Home 
Office, 2009). 
Of these five components, the Prevent strategy (Prevent) stands out. Only Prevent 
will be addressed here because it is an attempt to counter terrorist ideology domestically. 
As such, the Prevent strategy offers a potential long-term solution to a national security 
concern because it aims to counter the appeal of extremists’ narratives locally, appeals 
that may vary from community to community and individual to individual. The Prevent 
strategy promotes a joint effort between government and community to decrease 
terrorism by acting along five main axes (Home Office, 2010):  
1. Challenge violent extremist ideologies and support mainstream ideology; 
2. Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the institutions 
that are victim to such voices; 
  47
3. Support individuals who are being or have been recruited to the cause of 
violent extremism;  
4. Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism; and  
5. Address the grievances that ideologues are exploiting.  (UK Home Office, 
2010d) 
Communities are expected to play an active role in countering radicalization by 
developing support functions that provide positive options to those who may be 
vulnerable to recruitment. Such individuals regularly come into contact with government 
officials (including but not limited to law enforcement), community workers, or religious 
figures. 
1. Countering the Islamist Extremist Narrative 
Disrupting the propagandists of al Qaeda and like-minded extremists is central to 
the Prevent strategy. UK laws allow for arrest and prosecution of radicalizers who would 
incite violence or provide justification for violent acts (Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 
2006), but the application of executive action by law enforcement officials is coordinated 
by police with local authorities. In turn, local authorities can prepare to address the 
ideological vacuum that might result from law enforcement action. Thus, the Prevent 
strategy recognizes the importance of consultation and coordination between agencies 
prior to law enforcement action in order to affect the community in a positive or least 
damaging way.  
Other alternatives also exist in this framework. In many instances, the government 
may be able to bring about intervention by the community at a point in the radicalization 
process that is prior to commission of a criminal act. Rather than enforce petty criminal 
offenses, local government authorities, including the police, community leaders, and 
intelligence services may instead choose to support community groups or leaders who are 
willing to intervene to disrupt the radicalization process through a variety of nonjudicial 
techniques. This manner of disrupting the radicalization process surrenders nothing from 
the government—charges can always be pursued at a time of the government’s choosing 
if deradicalization efforts don’t work. But such opportunities develop trust between 
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Prevent partners and offer the promise of future collaboration to address threats and 
diminish the risk of perpetuating the “state versus  Islam” narrative. 
Building trusting relationships with the community assists in understanding 
grievances; by addressing grievances positively, the government gains credibility with 
the public. Actions along this axis include creating safe venues for debate and a space to 
discuss extremism. These venues also allow for community leaders to challenge calls to 
violence. 
The government, and particularly the police force, works directly with community 
leaders and activists to build strong community leadership and increase the community’s 
ability for “self help” in providing social services and positive alternatives for the 
community at large. In order to increase the capacity of communities to resist violent 
extremism, the police services adhere to community policing models, including civilian 
police community support officers (PCSOs) specifically designed to serve as a bridge 
between police and the public (UK Metropolitan Police , 2010). This strand of the 
Prevent strategy involves direct involvement with Muslim communities and their leaders 
through forums, town-hall meetings, research and focus groups, and educational services. 
In one example, the Kent Constabulary developed the “Partners and Community 
Together” (PACT) program, where police work alongside elected, religious, and 
neighborhood leaders to address community needs, be they increased patrols or 
facilitating neighborhood clean-ups. The local police are dedicated to providing 
accessible and visible policing teams that respond to the needs of local communities (UK 
Kent Constabulary, 2010). This type of collaboration brings together members of the 
government and community who, working together, exert a positive influence on the 
environment that is much greater than the influence they might generate working on 
separate, parallel paths. 
The Prevent program also supports nongovernment organizations and educators to 
build resiliency to violent extremism through a wide array of activities. The Creativity, 
Culture and Education (CCE) program is aimed at exposing children to different cultures 
and to encouraging critical thought and shared identities as British citizens. CCE is 
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responsible for a range of programs that it develops in collaboration with local 
communities. The programs vary from efforts like Spirit of Hyndburn, a photography 
project that “encapsulates the diversity” of the township; Not in My Name, an interactive 
theatre project that “boldly and unreservedly explores issues around religious extremism 
and terrorism”; and London Tigers, a community-led sports and youth charity that aims 
to build leadership and provide a positive environment to explore religion and good 
citizenship (UK, 2010). 
The “Channel” program, within the Prevent framework, is designed to provide “a 
mechanism for assessing and supporting people who may be targeted by violent 
extremists or drawn in to violent extremism” (UK Home Office, Channel, 2010e).  
The program is administered by a local channel coordinator and includes the 
participation of a panel of representatives from government, nongovernment 
organizations, and community leaders who come together to discuss with great specificity 
individual cases of radicalization, and to develop local strategies to address the threat. In 
cases where an individual is believed to have begun the radicalization process, panel 
members devise a strategy suited to the particular individual. Actions necessarily vary by 
individual but can result in religious counseling from a perspective that does not condone 
terrorist violence in order to impact the subject on a theological framework, direct 
communication with family members of the subject, or in more serious instances, 
removing a child from foster care and resettling the child with other foster parents. This 
program has been controversial due to its focus on Safi orientations and concerns over 
privacy matters (Alarabiya.net, 2009). 
The UK Prevent strategy has recently been expanded to include right-wing 
extremists as well as Muslims. 
2. Organizational Structure 
a. Home Office 
The United Kingdom’s counterterrorism strategy emanates from the Home Office, 
which has overall responsibility for immigration and passports, drug policy, 
counterterrorism, and police (UK Home Office, 2010c). The UK enjoys the advantages of 
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a unified command under Home Office direction for the counterterrorism mission 
because each officer in the security apparatus can trace missions and guidance to a 
common source. Overarching policing policies and philosophy are set by the central 
government, which also controls strategy, training, and funding. This framework ensures 
a common sense of mission, a common language, and an intelligence-minded culture for 
the counterterrorism community. 
b. Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) 
The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) was established as 
part of the Home Office “to give strategic direction to the UK’s work to counter the threat 
from international terrorism.” The OSCT reports to both the secretary of the Home Office 
and the under secretary for security and counterterrorism. The OSCT is directly 
responsible for implementing and coordinating efforts across the “whole of government” 
in the implementation of the CONTEST strategy. The overarching responsibility of the 
OSCT ensures a broad-lens view of the terrorism challenge. This multidimensional 
perspective informs recommendations for legislation, guidance, and funding to set a 
“strategic government” response. OSCT ensures that the counterterrorism effort is 
addressed through collective effort (UK National Archives, 2010a). 
c. Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) 
The Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) of the 
OSCT was created in 2007, to ensure consistent counterterrorism “messaging” across all 
levels of government. Like the OSCT, RICU is responsible to key leaders within the 
Home Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for 
Communities and Local Government. CONTEST communications strategies are 
developed by RICU, which assists local governments to communicate more effectively 
regarding CONTEST. The UK’s Home office is attuned to “short-term opportunities and 
developing longer-term communications projects, to weaken terrorist ideologies and 
strengthen credible alternatives to them.” Informed by a broad and deep understanding of 
the complex systems that result in terrorism, RICU plays an invaluable role in the “battle 
of ideas.” The UK staffs RICU with experts from a spectrum of fields, including 
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intelligence officers, anthropologists, and educators. These “academic practitioners” 
conduct research and analysis to ensure that decision makers across government speak 
with consistency regarding policy matters and government actions (UK National 
Archives, 2010b). 
d. Government Offices 
This is not to say, however, that all counterterrorism operations are strictly 
directed from London. Instead, government offices (GOs) form multiagency regional 
resilience forums that are convened in each English region to coordinate wide-area 
planning and to act as a bridge between central government and the local response (UK 
Home Office, 2006. Each regional GO is encouraged to develop strategies to address 
threats in the local context because the UK recognizes the dynamics that fuel terrorist 
threats vary in different parts of the country, and it appreciates that tactics employed in 
one region may not work in another. GOs also coordinate “best practices” within and 
between regions (UK Communities and Local Government Committee, 2008.  
Joint-service counter-radicalization efforts like those described above, are 
coordinated at regional and local levels through GOs, which have the capacity to provide 
“full-service” responses to local grievances and have been fully integrated into the UK’s 
counterterrorism strategy. This allows the GOs:  
• To foster partnership of police and citizens to involve the whole 
community in strategies to promote greater public safety; 
• To take a problem-solving approach to identify and effectively address the 
underlying conditions that give rise to crime and disorder; 
• To transform the government to respond to community needs more 
effectively; 
• To enhance the understanding of interdisciplinary capabilities between 
government agencies.  
The UK model demonstrates that joint-agency coordination at regional 
and local levels can ensure that national strategies are resourced and prioritized correctly 
where it counts—in regular interaction with the public. In turn, GOs ensure that the 
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central government is informed regarding the intricacies of the region. When information 
from various GOs is consolidated, a national threat picture can be developed with 
sufficient specificity to materially affect strategic planning. 
A further advantage of joint service is that some government officers, 
including selected MI5 personnel, are required to serve three-year tours outside central 
headquarters. This facilitates the transmission of fresh ideas back to London and a better 
understanding of interdisciplinary capabilities for developing leaders. Rotation of 
mangers outside of headquarters also provides central headquarters with an improved 
understanding of localized dynamics (UK Security Service, 2010). 
C. CRITICISM OF THE STRATEGY 
The Prevent program has been subject to mixed reviews by Muslims and the 
Parliament. Some Muslims fear discrimination: “There is the perception that the 
government is sponsoring Muslim organizations on the basis of theological criteria – —
for example holding Sufis to be intrinsically more moderate than Salafis” (UK 
Communities and Local Government Committee, 2010).  
From the British point of view, a focus on Salafists9 makes sense in an 
intelligence-led policing (ILP)10 model because 
the UK National Intelligence Model emphasizes that crime is not 
randomly distributed, with the corollary that identification of hotspots of 
criminal activity is a worthwhile pursuit. It recognizes the importance of 
working with partnerships to achieve crime prevention, and finally that 
there should be a spotlight on targeting the criminal and not a focus on the 
crime. (Ratcliffe, 2003) 
                                                 
9 For the purpose of this thesis, the term “global Salafi jihadist” refers to an adherent to an 
ultraconservative form of Islam that subverts the ideology of peaceful fundamentalist Muslim groups to 
promote a peaceful message and repudiate terrorist violence. 
10 According to Ratcliffe, “The aim of intelligence-led policing can be interpreted from the tactical 
tasking priorities of the UK National Intelligence Model, as disseminated by the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service (NCIS). The four elements concentrate on: targeting offenders (especially the targeting 
of active criminals through overt and covert means); the management of crime and disorder hotspots; the 
investigation of linked series of crimes and incidents; and the application of preventative measures, 
including working with local partnerships to reduce crime and disorder.” 
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In accordance with this policy, the UK has focused its efforts on the ideological 
group it perceives to be particularly vulnerable to recruitment by the likes of al Qaeda. 
The effectiveness of the UK’s ILP strategy will depend on its implementation and 
balance of hard and soft power. According to Marc Sageman’s testimony before the 9/11 
Commission, bin Laden and like minded extremists adhere to a “global Salafi jihadist” 
ideology that is an ultra-conservative form of Islam, which subverts the ideology of 
“peaceful fundamentalist Muslim groups … [that might] … promote a peaceful message 
and repudiate terrorist violence” (Sageman, 2003). Therefore, the mass population—a 
recruiting pool for both terrorists and the government—is central to the UK strategy. The 
challenge for the British government is to disrupt and discredit the Islamist message 
without alienating the mass population or focusing so many resources on the Salafi 
community that it alienates other underprivileged minorities. 
Civil libertarians and free-speech advocates have also voiced opposition to the 
Prevent program: 
The atmosphere promoted by Prevent is one in which to make radical 
criticism of the government is to risk losing funding and face isolation as 
an ‘extremist.’… Depoliticizing young people and restricting radical 
dissent is actually counterproductive. (Kundnani, 2009) 
The British have also been criticized for engaging principally with moderates 
within the Muslim community. Nick Chatrath, of Oxford’s faculty of Oriental Studies, 
for instance, opined in a critique of the Muslim Council of Britain’s effectiveness in the 
radicalization effort that 
in the face of growing radicalisation in Britain, Muslim leaders are 
ignoring extremists’ points of view and glossing over some of the more 
unsavoury parts of Islam’s ancient texts… This attitude must change, as 
the best way to extinguish extremist arguments is to deal with them out in 
the open, not just sweep them under the carpet and hope for the best. 
(Gledhill, 2010) 
But despite challenges and some opposition, it appears that many in the Muslim 
world understand the intent of the Prevent strategy, even in Saudi Arabia, where one 
might expect much opposition:  
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If … the policy is applied sensitively and Muslims are supported in their 
disgust at terrorism, rather than challenged over their loyalty to the UK, 
then [the Prevent strategy] may be a useful contribution to combating the 
men of violence (Arab News, 2010). 
D. ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGY’S IMPACT 
It is difficult to conclusively evaluate the impact of the UK strategy. The current 
threat assessment for the UK remains heightened, at the “severe” level, which means an 
attack is officially considered “very likely” (UK Home Office, 2010c). Review of the 
Prevent strategy is subject to mixed results, and it may be premature to make a definitive 
call as to the strategy’s effectiveness. It can be logically inferred from the “Troubles” that 
domestic tranquility is, realistically, a long way off and that the British government is 
truly in a battle to win the “hearts and minds” of a rising generation. Through Prevent, the 
government is correctly aligned to this goal.  
Anecdotally, there is evidence of increased cooperation in some arenas. For 
example, Andrew Ibrahim, a Muslim convert, was reported to a police community 
relations officer when he discussed suicide bombing. According to the senior 
investigating officer, “He [Ibrahim] was unknown to us, the first thing we knew about his 
device was from the Muslim community. All of Bristol should be grateful to them for 
providing information. Without a doubt they saved people from serious injury and worse” 
(Gardham, 2009). This is exactly the end that Prevent aims to achieve—an alert 
community that is willing to cooperate with government authorities. 
Polling data, too, indicates positive movement toward coexistence. British 
Muslims rejected moral justification for attacks on civilian targets at a slightly higher rate 
(3%) than in 2006–2007 polling. (Muslim West Facts, 2009). While the rate of 
condemnation changed very little, it is important to note that those able to morally justify 
a violent attack on a civilian target fell from two percent to less than one-half percent. It 
would appear that Prevent is, at least, positively influencing the most radical of British 
Muslims. Prevent appears to be on the right track.  
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
IN THE NETHERLANDS 
A. THE BASIS OF DUTCH STRATEGY 
1. The Dutch Experience with Homegrown Terrorism 
The Netherlands suffered dramatic acts of terrorism during the 1970s from 
Malaccan nationalists—exiles, and the children of exiles, who lived in the Netherlands 
but maintained close affinity and historical roots in the Moluccas Islands, part of the 
colonial Dutch East Indies. These Malaccans formed a government in exile that was 
determined to regain control of their homeland and sought Dutch support for their cause.  
Dutch Malaccans first migrated to the Netherlands when the Dutch government 
was obligated to demobilize 4,000 troops of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) 
and their families, who led the fight against Indonesian independence from 1945–49. This 
first wave of Dutch Malaccans was treated poorly by the Dutch government and never 
fully integrated into Dutch society (Yaeger, 1990). Both the Dutch government and 
native Malaccans expected the former KNIL soldiers and their families to quickly return 
to the Moluccas. That resulted in heavy barriers to integration imposed by the 
government on the former KNIL soldiers who once comprised the social elite of their 
native islands (Frenkiel, 2001). Exiles were discouraged from work, “forced to idleness, 
isolated in their camps [many were housed in WWII concentration camps], robbed of 
their military status, confronted another climate, [and struggled to learn the Dutch 
language]” (Rule, 1989).  
In effect, the Dutch Malaccan population lived in isolation from Dutch society 
until it became clear at the end of the decade that their residence in the Netherlands 
would be permanent (Janse, 2005, pp. 59–60), at which time conditions began to 
gradually improve. Still, resentment regarding their treatment, relative shifts in social 
status, and perceived betrayal of their loyalty to the Netherlands ran deep in the 
community of exiles (Brouwer, 2010).  
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The Dutch-Malaccan community was incensed by its perception of unfair 
treatment by the Netherlands. Through Malaccan eyes, the Dutch applied inconsistent 
foreign policy that on one hand supported independence for Suriname but on the other 
hand denied support for Malacca’s independent rule. (Both states were part of the Dutch 
colonial empire until 1949). When second-generation Dutch-Malaccans came of age, they 
closely identified with the cause of their parents, possibly because of the alienation they 
and their parents had experienced in the Netherlands. They had no basis for affinity to the 
Netherlands. Based on these underlying circumstances, it is possible to understand why 
second and third generations of Dutch Malaccans clung to the nationalist cause of 
independence, rather than embrace the Dutch culture into which they were born 
(Naerssen, 2007). The result of the Dutch-Malaccans’ identification with their families 
abroad, paired with local isolation and legitimate local grievances, was manifested in 
eight dramatic terrorist attacks or attempts over the next eight years, including an 
attempted assassination of the royal family, hijackings, murder, and mass hostage taking 
of schoolchildren (Global Terrorism Database, 2010). With the exception of the final 
attack in 1978 (a train hijacking), terrorist attacks garnered broad support for the act from 
the Dutch-Malaccan community.  
The short-term response to violent acts by the Dutch-Malaccans was aggressive 
and repressive. In the aftermath of the first dramatic Dutch-Malaccan attack, the 1970 
hostage-taking at the Indonesian ambassador’s residence in Wassenaar, in which a police 
officer was killed, the Prime Minister of Justice “ordered a major raid on the Moluccas’ 
camp, Ijsseloord, as a show of force and to arrest suspected extremists. One thousand 
soldiers and special police forces, backed up with helicopters and tanks entered the camp, 
hermetically sealed it and patrolled in armored vehicles” (Rassner, 2005). This extremist 
action likely caused more resentment and anger from the mass population, a point 
validated by the disrupted attempt by 13 Dutch-Malaccans to kidnap Queen Juliana only 
four months later (Time Magazine, 1975). 
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a. Internal Review and Adjustments 
Considering the very personal nature of such an attempt on the nation’s 
royal family and the continuing vitriol from the Dutch-Malaccan community, it might 
have been understandable for the Dutch government to pursue a retaliatory program, 
create new laws, or reorganize to deal explicitly with the obvious “Malaccan problem.” 
Instead, the Dutch government addressed the hostage-taking and murders in accordance 
with established criminal laws and sought to understand and address the underlying 
circumstances that had resulted in the terrorist acts.  
Rather than enhancing sentences for political crimes, and creating new 
laws to address violent political acts, the Dutch court recognized the legitimacy of some 
Malaccan grievances. The court concluded that the government ought to reflect on Dutch 
obligations toward the people of  the South Moluccas over the past 20 years; it suggested 
that the Dutch government engage in dialogue with the Dutch-Malaccan community 
(Janse, 2005, p. 62). With these considerations in mind, the court assigned only one year 
in prison to each of the hostage-takers (Rassner, 2005). This very public demonstration of 
Dutch intent to understand and subsequently to address the causes of terrorism would 
serve as a foundation for a new aspect of the Netherlands’ approach to counterterrorism. 
Application of soft power would serve as a vehicle for the government to regain 
credibility with the the Malaccan population. The strategy would continue to evolve, and 
continuing assessments by the government would contribute to future, more efficient and 
refined applications of military and police action against hostage-takers.  
As suggested above, the Dutch appear to have taken a long-term strategic 
position with the intent to prevent future terroristic acts. They were willing to consider 
Malaccan concerns in its domestic policies, despite attacks from radical elements of the 
community. This was an important and politically risky venture for the Dutch, since the 
Mallacan terrorists were by far the most damaging of terrorist groups to Dutch society; 
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the public verged on severe polarization in reaction to the attacks.11 The government 
faced the challenge of the general public’s demand for aggressive tactics to confront 
violent acts of terrorism that targeted not only government officials and edifices, but also 
schoolchildren and mass transit. 
Without hesitating to use force to address violent acts, the government 
focused tactically on the crimes of violence and simultaneously adhered to a long-term 
strategy aimed at addressing the messages that those acts communicated. To stop the flow 
of new generations of terrorists, the Dutch believed it necessary to address social factors 
that contributed to the radicalization process. They sought to understand and address the 
social and cultural grievances of the Malaccan nationalists. The Dutch government 
demonstrated its willingness to consider the social impact of its policies and their long-
term implications for domestic security, without compromising established foreign 
policy.  
The government’s recognition of the need for engagement did not translate 
immediately to effective programs, however. Despite recognition of the need to change as 
early as 1971, successful implementation of strategies to counter the homegrown threat 
was delayed for more than half a decade because of the “tensions between the various 
governmental offices” (Janse, 2005). This challenge would have to be overcome in order 
to fully implement a strategy that included both hard and soft power.  
b. Government Influence Increased 
In 1976, a panel of Dutch Malaccans was established to advise the 
government on social and cultural conditions of that population. One of the more 
progressive developments was the formation of “a triad of government agencies, 
nongovernment organizations and advocacy groups” (Rassner, 2005) that cooperated on 
improving relations. These efforts not only ensured dialogue between the Dutch 
                                                 
11 The Provisional Irish Republican Army was more lethal in the Netherlands than Malaccan terrorists 
during the 1980s but the terror instilled by the Malaccans was more damaging to the social fabric of the 
Netherlands. The PIRA targeted British nationals with surgical precision (principally British government 
officials, including the British ambassador), whereas Dutch Malaccans tended to attack “soft” targets like 
transit systems and schoolchildren. 
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government and the Dutch-Malaccan community, they also provided a platform to air 
concerns and to create projects that required mutual contributions—for instance, the 
construction of a Malaccan Historical Museum to educate the public on the experiences 
of Dutch-Malaccans. 
c. Impact 
As in the British experience with the IRA, results of the soft-power 
approach were not immediate. In some quarters of the Dutch-Malaccan community, 
cultural and familial ties run deep, and some still feel passionately about the chance for 
independence of the Moluccas Islands. The impact of the soft-power strategy is evident, 
though. The last terrorist attack by Dutch-Malaccans was in 1978, and the violent 
nationalists’ passionate ideology no longer resonates broadly. As the current president of 
the exiled Malaccan government in the Netherlands recently pointed out, “We’re living in 
different times now. We believe that to achieve our aim—the establishment of an 
independent state—we don’t need to use violence. It’s better to choose a path of dialogue, 
lobbying and all that. That way, we’ll actually achieve more” (Brouwer, 2010).  
2. Dutch Experience with Islamic Extremism 
a. Current Threat 
As in the UK, the Netherlands recognizes a multidimensional threat to 
national security: radical Islam—“jihadists” in Dutch terminology—as well as both 
internal and external threats from radicalization. Like the UK—and for that matter, much 
of the West—the threat posed by Islamist ideology is considered to be dissimilar to 
previous experiences with terrorism. “The complexity of [the threat] prompts us to give 
up our usual perceptions and to translate the new approach into policy measures” 
(Netherlands, NCTb, 2004, p. 6).  
Indications of radicalization in Dutch society became evident shortly after 




Moroccan descent were killed by the Indian army in Kashmir. Soon thereafter, Dutch 
authorities publicly acknowledged that a network of Islamic militants were recruiting 
Dutch citizens for jihad (Simons, 2002).  
According to the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism’s (NCTb), 
Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, at this time in the Netherlands, “there 
was a tendency to downplay the problem… Even if Dutch Muslims were being recruited 
for the jihad, they were choosing to seek martyrdom elsewhere.... The risk that these 
young radicals could bring jihad to Western Europe, even to the Netherlands was 
conceivable but thought at the time to be minimal” (Ongering, 2007). The good news for 
the Netherlands was that radical Islamists were recruiting for foreign battlegrounds in 
places like Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, that paradigm would soon 
change as well.  
Europe was attacked by al Qaeda’s exploded multiple bombs on Madrid’s 
rail system on March 11, 2004. In April of the same year, the Minister of Justice 
conducted a review of the Netherland’s counterterrorism apparatus. The findings of this 
research resulted in the creation of the office of the NCTb, which soon faced the first 
lethal case of homegrown Islamist terrorism in the Netherlands, the internationally 
publicized murder of Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004. The domestic intelligence 
service was thus commissioned to assess counterterrorism strategies employed by other 
Western nations in order to determine the best way forward for the Dutch government. 
The Dutch would draw from not just their own experiences with Malaccan nationalists 
but also from best practices of other nations to formulate policies moving forward. 
b. Strategic Assessment 
The Netherlands does not have a formal counterterrorism doctrine. Instead 
a compilation of policy papers and letters that define its efforts to combat terrorism reveal 
an approach that is based on previous experience with homegrown and international 
terrorism, as well as scholarly review of the policies and approaches of other 
governments (Netherlands, Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2009). Dutch 
counterterrorism strategy is clear, even if not codified: 
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Firstly, to strengthen the ties within Dutch society, especially by groups 
open to radical ideas. Secondly, to empower society, i.e. increase its 
defenses, so that individuals as well as communities may oppose the 
extremism that affects them or tries to recruit them. Thirdly, to intervene 
actively through the creative use of existing judicial and administrative 
measures—both by central and municipal governments—and through the 
development of a limited number of new measures. These include making 
the glorification of violence a criminal offence and measures against 
terrorist statements and sowing hatred on the Internet. (Netherlands 
Ministry of Justice, 2005) 
The NCTb observed in 2005 that the jihadist threat was “inextricably 
linked with international developments … such as the deployment of Dutch [military] 
units in Afghanistan and the growing international interest in interethnic relationships in 
the Netherlands” (Netherlands, National anti-terrorism coordinator, 2005). But the Dutch 
analysis went well beyond the obvious physical threat to national security (attacks on 
critical infrastructure, assassination, mass killing, or threats thereof) in its assessment. 
The Netherlands considered the implications of an ideological struggle and the threat that 
radical Islam poses to Dutch society—the threat to the codified and more ephemeral 
“vertical relationships” between government and its citizens, as well “horizontal 
relationships” between citizens or groups of citizens. The Dutch view it as a 
constitutional obligation to protect its society against any who would seek to undermine 
its “democratic legal order” with violence. 
Democratic legal order is compromised when (undefined) amounts of 
social trust, social cohesion, solidarity, active citizenship and loyalty do not meet 
adequate levels.12 (Netherlands, NCTb, 2004, p. 6). With this concept in mind, the 
Netherlands, considered to be one of the more liberal nations in Europe, perceived that 
the nation might be affected by a social chasm between ultraconservative Muslims and 
the rest of the Dutch population. To the Dutch government, societal cohesiveness is a 
fundamental national security concern, and the ability to maintain democratic legal order 
is of the utmost importance to the nation.  
                                                 
12 For a detailed discussion of the concept of “democratic legal order and its role in the assessment of 
the Islamist threat to the Netherlands, see “From Dawa to Jihad,” p. 6–16 (Netherlands, NCTb  2004). 
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The strategic implications of the General Intelligence and Security 
Service’s (AIVD) assessments led to changes in structure, policy, new laws, and more 
specific terminology that lay the framework for the new “broad approach” to 
counterterrorism. The Dutch define terrorism as “threatening, making preparations for or 
perpetrating, for ideological reasons, acts of serious violence directed at people or other 
acts intended to cause property damage that could spark social change, creating a climate 
of fear among the general public, or influencing political decision-making” (Netherlands, 
NCTb, 2010c). 
When Dutch counterterrorism communications and actions are considered 
in sum, it is apparent that the Netherlands executes a balanced strategy that employs both 
hard and soft power.  
B. CURRENT STRATEGY  
1. Countering the Narrative 
The NCTb considers terrorism “the ultimate consequence of a development 
starting with radicalization processes. … Combating terrorism starts with combating the 
radicalization processes” (Netherlands, NCTb, 2004, p.6). In turn, radicalization is the 
preferred intervention point for the Netherlands to address the threat—better to prevent 
terrorism on the front end than to risk physical threats and interethnic and interreligious 
conflict. To that end, the government believes that it must act against radicalism under 
two conditions: 
1) When such radicalism directly results in violence or other criminal 
activity;  
2) When a form of radicalism that rejects the democratic rule of law gathers a 
large following. (Netherlands, Ministry of Justice, 2005) 
With a clear preference for early intervention that denies a platform to 
radicalizers, the Netherlands developed new laws that enhanced state powers toward this 
goal. The European Union agreed on a strategy framework to combat terrorism and 
established a universal baseline response for member states (European Union, 2004). The 
common strategy framework is based on four pillars: “Prevent, Protect, Pursue and 
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Respond” (European Union, 2005).13 For instance, it is now a crime to recruit on behalf a 
designated terrorist organization. But “most EU-wide results have been obtained in the 
‘Protect’ strand, where the European Commission is a leading actor, and in ‘Pursue’, 
where the member states’ vital interests are at stake and close cross-border cooperation is 
vital. Less progress has been recorded in ‘Prevent’ and ‘Respond” (Coolsaet, 2010, p. 
865). Along the “prevent” pillar, the Dutch have far exceeded EU baseline performance.  
The Netherlands also enhanced its own state powers via the Dutch Act on the 
Extension of the Scope for Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Crimes (ESIPTC). 
The purpose of the act was “to enable the police and the public prosecution service to 
initiate criminal proceedings as early as possible in order to prevent terrorist attacks from 
taking place” (Poot et al., 2008. Some of the provisions of this act were dramatic and 
indicate how seriously the Netherlands considers the threat of radicalization. The ESIPTC 
act made it possible for an individual suspected of being involved in a terrorist crime to 
be arrested without meeting the legal threshold of “probable cause,” and it delayed the 
moment at which the suspect of a terrorist crime will be allowed to inspect all court 
documents; this time limit can be postponed for a longer period, since the maximum 
pretrial detention period can continue for an extra two years. 
Another significant change in policy came in the form of the Aliens Act 
(Netherlands, NCTb, 2010a). The Aliens Act allows for expedited removal of aliens who 
are judged by the AIVD to be a threat to national security or “public order.” The Aliens 
Act also allows for “a recommendation to refuse entry, cancellation of a residence permit, 
removal from the Netherlands, declaring a person to be an undesirable alien, placing 
them on an alert list and refusing to grant Dutch nationality (or its withdrawal if it has 
already been granted). The measures enable the national security apparatus to physically 
separate radicalizers from the potential recruiting pool. Removal actions are expedited, 
which means radicalizers are simply removed from the country. Streamlining this 
                                                 
13 The EU counterterrorism strategy builds on preliminary steps that are articulated in the Council 
Framework Decision of June 13, 2002, on combating terrorism. This decision neatly captures specific steps 
agreed to by European Council member nations to combat terrorism. Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:164:0003:0007:EN:PDF. 
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procedure dampens the radicalizer or terrorist supporter’s ability to inflame his followers’ 
sentiments and mitigates the potential for the radicalizer to gain public sympathy. 
The above measures reflect a continuing willingness to apply hard power to 
address the counter-radicalization mission, but soft power is employed extensively. The 
Netherlands posits that recruitment by Islamist terrorists “demonstrates the fact that the 
fight against Islamist terrorism does not only require great effort on the part of 
intelligence and security services, police and judicial authorities, but also permanent 
alertness in other policy areas, like immigration and aliens policy and integration” 
(Akerboom, 2003). This holistic, broad-based approach means that the Netherlands is 
faced with the challenge of finding the right balance between confronting extremism and 
fostering diversity. 
The NCTb policy calls for municipalities to work directly with communities to 
develop localized strategies. In example, Amsterdam supplements the efforts of the 
NCTb by 
• Focusing on the long-term sustainability of the inclusive, pluralist society 
in which Islam has an accepted place;  
• Building resilience among and with the Muslim communities so that an 
alternative can be provided to radical ideologies through specific 
prevention; and  
• Investing in formal and informal networks that can report early warning 
signals as well as intervene as early as possible in individual cases of 
actual radicalization. (Mellis, 2007) 
2. Organizational Structure 
a. NCTb 
The NCTb reports to both the Minister of Justice and the Minister of 
Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations and sits at the apex of counterterrorism 
operations for the country, managing components of approximately 20 agencies. In this 
capacity, the NCTb was designed to address critical needs through the following means:  
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• A single joint strategic conceptual policy framework, agreed to on an 
international basis and to be used to determine priorities in policy and 
action; 
• A single central institution to organize the required higher level of 
collaboration, leadership, and perseverance, like a spider with its web; 
• The collation, assessment and use of information collected by third 
parties; 
• An administrative and statutory structure, appropriate to the gravity of the 
situation, setting out the requisite powers in connection with 
counterterrorism. (Donner & Remkes, 2004) 
The practical implications of these needs are that NCTb is responsible for:  
• Analysis of intelligence and other information; 
• Policy development; 
• Coordination of anti-terrorist measures. 
By coordinating these tasks at a central point, agencies work less often at 
cross purposes and function in support of a strategy designed by the national government, 
rather than an internal strategy that may overlap the role or mission of another. The single 
strategic coordination point increases the effectiveness of the government’s efforts to 
combat terrorism and ensures efforts to counter terrorism are conducted in concert with 
one another. At the same time, none of the component agencies holds counterterrorism as 
its principal reason for existence: terrorism is but one of many matters that each of these 
agencies addresses. For this reason, a coordination point was deemed essential to the 
Dutch Counterterrorism effort (Netherlands. Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs & 
Kingdom Relations, 2004). 
b. Regional/Municipal Boards 
At a regional level, the General Intelligence and Security Service of the 
Netherlands (AIVD), a civilian intelligence service responsible for national security 
threats, works with the Dutch national police from 25 regional service offices. These 
regional police forces are governed by regional police boards consisting of mayors and a 
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chief public prosecutor (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], 
2009). The regional police boards maintain both vertical communications through the 
parallel “national police” and AIVD reports and analysis, as well as through regional 
partners. The result is a networked structure that allows for an  
up-to-date picture … within the municipal authority of the situation as 
regards integration and radicalisation. Indications of any threat that young 
men or others (girls or women) might be likely to turn against society or 
towards radicalism might first be noted by employees of the local 
authority, or by Muslim communities, the police, schools, social services 
… housing corporations or community centres and clubs. (Donner, 2004) 
Thus, AIVD can identify, advise, and mobilize regional and local 
leadership to independently reduce the risk of terrorism (Netherlands. Algemen 
Inlichtingen-en Veilighdsdienst [Netherlands, AIVD], 2009).  
With only about 80 personnel, the NCTb serves as a strong strategic guide 
for the AIVD and the police who, on the basis of the Intelligence and Security Services 
Act 2002, play the largest governmental roles in the counterterrorism mission 
(Akerboom, 2003). In this way, police boards can enjoy the benefit of intelligence at a 
national level as provided by the NCTb and at the regional and local level by AIVD and 
the police, and they are further informed by community contacts through both law 
enforcement and nongovernment entities. This affords the opportunity to reduce 
radicalization through a variety of means, not just enforcement action. 
The direct engagement of local political leaders in this process ensures 
that the government is positioned and accountable for engagement with the public and 
that the leadership of the regional counterterrorism effort is attuned to factors that may 
influence radicalization. The regional structure supports an “intelligence mindset” of the 
police and a culture of alertness to local indicators that could signify radicalization. At 
the same time, the collaborative evaluation ensures the critical evaluation of intelligence 
and information reports. This capability is essential because behaviors that are alarming 
in one location may be normal in another context. 
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3. Counter Radicalization and Deradicalization 
The willingness to engage with potential recruits to violent extremism, paired 
with a regionalized structure and a detailed understanding of local influences has resulted 
in a very progressive and nuanced approach to counter radicalization in the Netherlands. 
In fact, since 2006, “the focus of official counterterrorism efforts fell increasingly on 
deradicalization, with ‘repressive’ counterterrorism taking a back seat” (Demant & De 
Graaf, 2010, p. 418). Amsterdam, the largest city in its municipal region, pursues 
counter-radicalization at the individual level (Demant et al., 2008, p. 177). This process is 
developed, informed, and executed by “an intricate web of ministries, governmental 
agencies, local authorities, social services, educational facilities, think tanks, religious 
institutions and freelance consultants (Vindino, 2008, p. 12). The central government 
provides a large part of the funding, training, and overarching strategy for the counter-
radicalization effort. Local authorities, through the components described above, 
coordinate and execute local strategies to support the larger picture. These strategies are 
mostly based on the Amsterdam model that defines the radicalization processes and a 
model for deradicalization, created by Colin Mellis, the Amsterdam municipal 





Figure 1.   Explaining Radicalization 
Demand: Mellis asserts that demand is increasing in the Netherlands, particularly 
from young generations who experience a crisis of identity. These individuals are 
embroiled in psychological conflicts between “Westernization” and “Muslim” identities. 
Conflicted individuals may seek to expand their knowledge of Islam. 
Supply: Radical ideologies that encourage violent extremism are abundant on the 
Internet, through traveling imams and radical individuals that the potential recruit might 
encounter in daily life. Suppliers of the “global jihadi” narrative actively seek to 
influence the recruiting pool to adopt in-group/out-group perspectives. 
Breeding ground: The breeding ground consists of the societal context that is 
experienced by the individual. According to Mellis, the breeding ground frustrations for 
Muslim-Americans might include experiences of discrimination, the depravity and 
immorality they perceive in Western culture, or social injustice that conflict with the 
  69
individual Muslim’s belief system. As a Muslim living in the West, some (and 
particularly young “seekers”) may withdraw from the mainstream and become less 
resilient to extremism. This vulnerability is particularly evident when the potential recruit 
experiences a personal crisis or “cognitive opening” that “shakes the certainty of 
previously held beliefs and renders individuals receptive to alternative perspectives 
(Mellis, 2007, p. 42). 
C. THE TWO-PRONGED APPROACH TO DE-RADICALIZATION 
Mellis proposes a two-pronged approach to combat radicalization. First, and 
broadly speaking, the Amsterdam model is aimed at societal influences on the individual. 
This is essentially a “policy aimed at individuals, and not the radical movement as a 
whole.  The decline of a radical movement is influenced indirectly, by ‘stealing away’ 
members” (Demant & De Graaf, 2010, p. 420). Embracing the recommendations from a 
study by the University of Amsterdam’s Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies 
(IMES) (European Union, 2008, p. 28) , the Amsterdam municipality has taken steps to: 
1) Increase societal trust;  
2) Increase political confidence;  
3) Increase religious defensibility;  
4) Find ways of contacting radical youngsters; and 
5) Provide assistance to mosques in countering radicalization  
Outreach efforts are intended to support the “binding” of an individual to social 
networks that engage in and support democratic society. When individuals are assessed to 
be at risk of radicalization, the government apparatus makes sure to support those in the 
individual’s life who counter the West versus  Islam narrative. 
The Dutch recognize that “tackling polarization and radicalization is primarily a 
matter for local governments” (Mellis, 2007, p. 43), but there is also a clear delineation 
between counter-radicalization and counter-radicalization efforts—the individual’s 
behaviors dictate which organization is the lead: “A distinction has been made between 
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‘thinking’ and ‘acting’. The moment there are indications of preparatory action(s) … the 
case becomes the responsibility of the police” (Mellis, 2007, p. 43–45).  
Amsterdam’s counter-radicalization model, as a conceptual framework, assigns 
responsibilities to the community (social network), religious leaders, and the government: 
• Those involved in the lives of at-risk youth increase resilience in at risk-
youth by nurturing confidence in an “inclusive democratic narrative and 
emphasizing potential and empowerment” despite obstacles; 
• Religious communities are actively encouraged and supported by the 
government to provide diverse and active alternative ideologies; and  
• Interconnected, formal, and informal networks positively address 
circumstances that result in frustration and anger. (Mellis, 2007, p. 43–44) 
Providing yet more specificity, Mellis describes how de-radicalization is tailored 
to individual cases with a separate model that has been adopted throughout the 
Netherlands. When individuals observe changes in an associate and decide to report the 
“signal,” the reporter seeks assistance from the Information House—a non-law 
enforcement collaborative body that works through dedicated case management teams 
(CMT) to analyze and assess the circumstances around the person at risk of 
radicalization. 
The CMT then draws from an established network of counter-radicalization 
partners to change the context of the at-risk subject. Early in the process, this may mean 
that the CMT identifies and facilitates employment or educational opportunities or 
positive group activity that exposes the at-risk person to broader world views and 
alternative perspectives that counter Islamist narratives. 
When the at-risk person has progressed further in the process, CMTs may instead 
call on religious experts—also within the trusted network—to attempt “ideological 
intervention.” Depending on how much the at-risk individual has internalized the violent 
extremist narrative, key figures may be introduced with varying knowledge bases. In 
moderate cases, “key figures … will need some knowledge of Islamic theology and 
democratic society, but those intervening later in the later stages of radicalization will 
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need to be theological experts of some stature.… The real challenge [of the CMT] is 
finding these figures and forging lasting alliances with them” (Mellis, 2007, p. 47).  
 
 
Figure 2.   The Case Process 
Trusting relationships between government, nongovernment, and religious 
partners in the counter-radicalization network are therefore crucial to successful 
intervention strategies because to be most effective these strategies should be applied as 
early as possible in the radicalization process. Low levels of trust between network 
members can delay or forestall the decision to report concerning behavior at any stage of 
the deradicalization process. 
D. ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGY’S IMPACT 
Based on its continuing assessment of the threat situation, the Netherlands 
reduced its national “threat level” in December 2009 to a condition that recognized the 
possibility of a terrorist attack but considers an attack unlikely. The assessment was based 
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on a diminished threat from core al Qaeda, which is largely on the defensive due to 
international pressure in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan. More relevant to the 
domestic policy discussed above, the Dutch posit that their policies have resulted in 
increased resilience of the Dutch Muslim population to violent Salafi ideology 
specifically because such groups lack coherent leadership, an impact that can be directly 
related to Dutch counterterrorism strategy. Further, and perhaps more importantly, 
Terrorist attacks in the Netherlands have been able to be prevented, thanks 
to the efforts of the intelligence and security services, the police … and 
many other services and organizations, but also as a result of the vigilance 
of ordinary citizens. Important in this context was society’s growing 
resilience, especially that of the Muslim communities, against 
radicalization. All of the above means that the group of radicals in our 
country, who are prepared to further their political or religious goals by 
means of violence, has steadily decreased in size, and more has become 
known about the operation and modus operandi of this group. 
(Netherlands, NCTb, 2009) 
Based on Dutch experiences with counter- and deradicalization efforts in the case 
of both Malaccans and Islamist terrorists, it appears that “not only government 
interventions, but also the discourse that is produced or reinforced through these 
interventions, have profound effect on the processes of de-radicalization [because] 
combating terrorism is itself a form of communication, just as terrorism itself is” 
(Demant & De Graaf, 2010). 
It may also be that the flexibility inherent in the Dutch approach provides both 
“repressive” tools to deal with the “doers” and a curative approach for “thinkers” that 
demonstrates government credibility and inclusiveness to the broader population 
(Vindino, 2008, p.12). What is undeniable is that the balanced-power strategy provides 
more tools to deal with radicalization in a way that can be tailored to local contexts—and 
that the Dutch model has been effective.  
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V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE UK AND DUTCH 
EXPERIENCES 
If everything is well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to 
keep the minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not 
fail to support and defend them. 
-Niccolo Machiavelli 
The evolution of British and Dutch counterterrorism policies provides useful 
insight as to how Western liberal democracies might best develop strategies of their own. 
The UK and the Netherlands have achieved unity of command for the counterterrorism 
mission; adopted flexible, learning, and networked structures; enhanced quality 
intelligence for decision makers; and separated radicalizing influences from the mass 
population. Elements of British and Dutch strategies should therefore be explored for 
common themes that might inform the counter-radicalization strategy and policies in the 
United States. Set against the four parameters identified for analysis, it becomes apparent 
that the British and Dutch governments have reached similar conclusions and changed 
both strategy and structure to balance hard and soft power: 
A. IS THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORT ALIGNED WITH THE THREAT? 
1. Defining the Threat 
British and Dutch governments recognize that extremist Islamist ideology is an 
existential threat14 to national security. Both nations consider that “new terrorism” 
spawns from Islamism (or “political Islam”), a worldview that places Islam “at the centre 
of an individual’s identity, as either the overriding or the only source of that identity... 
[and] essentially divides the world into two distinct spheres: ‘Muslims’ and ‘the rest’ ” 
                                                 
14 Kapitan (2008) describes the clearest form of “existential threat, a threat to a community’s very 
existence,” as “an attempted extermination of a community or nation that warrants a community’s recourse 
to self-defense.” He adds that the “even where extermination is not at issue, an aggressor might try to 
destroy a community in other ways, say, by enslavement or forced conversions of its members, destruction 
of its vital institutions (economic, agricultural, political, and cultural), appropriation of its natural resources, 
and seizure of its territory.” Both British and Dutch government definitions of terrorism seem to take such 
threats into account in regard to national identity. 
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(Maher & Frampton, 2009, p. 18). It is understood that the social changes that al Qaeda 
and similarly aligned Islamists aim to impose would fundamentally alter democratic 
government because of Islamist interpretation of the Koran. Both the UK and the 
Netherlands believe that the propagation of these forms of ideology, for instance through 
the glorification of martyrdom and the establishment of Islamic courts that function in 
parallel to the state’s authority, constitute an ideological attack on their pluralist societies.  
Encouraging violence (or actually engaging in violence) to obtain political or 
religious goals poses an inherent threat to the state and its citizens. At the other end of the 
threat spectrum, Islamists who pursue a “Dawa” strategy seek to continuously influence 
the mass population toward 
extreme puritanical, intolerant and anti-Western ideas. They want Muslims 
in the West to reject Western values and standards, propagating extreme 
isolation from Western society and often intolerance towards other groups 
in society. (Netherlands, NCTb, 2004, p. 7) 
Unlike rabbinical courts in the UK that address civil matters, many Islamic courts 
in Muslim countries receive severe criticism decrying the unequal treatment of women 
and inhumane punishments. Thus the suggestion to accommodate Islamic religious 
jurisprudence in the UK and the Netherlands evokes a strong emotional response from 
many elements of society: “The Archbishop of Canterbury, was pilloried for suggesting 
that the establishment of sharia in the future ‘seems unavoidable’ in Britain” (Taher, 
2008). In recognition of the rights of association and freedom of religion, the UK and the 
Netherlands have adopted a long-term strategy that is intended to attract Muslim citizens 
to their forms of democratic rule and integrate Muslim citizens into “mainstream” 
society. Both the UK and the Netherlands allow moderate forms of sharia as a 
mechanism for mediation in some civil matters (Feldman, 2008; Netherlands. Reasearch 
and Documentation Centre, 2010). 
2. Two-Pronged Approaches to Countering Radicalization 
Islamist terrorism is particularly threatening to liberal Western democracies 
because al Qaeda and its associated groups employ tactics intended to kill as many people 
as possible and a long-term strategy to change society in a way that conforms with their 
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passionately held religious beliefs. These are much broader aims than either PIRA or 
Malaccan terrorists. The Dutch and British recognize that the physical threat of terrorism 
is intended to “advance a … religious or ideological cause” or “spark social change.” For 
this reason, they approach terrorism along two coordinated fronts. Terrorist plots are 
confronted aggressively by strong law enforcement powers and underlying social 
problems that require a “whole government” response. 
Both governments developed components of their strategy that 1) impede the 
spread of Islamist messages, and 2) support those who actively counter this narrative. 
While methods of propagating Islamist ideologies are not always criminal in 
nature, British and Dutch approaches to counter terrorism recognize the long-term danger 
of polarization within their societies. As a result, these governments take active steps to 
address grievances of minority groups and promote an “inclusive” national identity that 
can provide security over the long haul. 
3. Criticality of Second and Third Generations 
The concept that “understanding the enemy” enhances a government’s ability to 
successfully defeat it is perhaps as old as military philosophy. In the cases of Malaccan 
and Irish terrorism, the Dutch and Ulster governments had policies or social structures 
that impeded integration and assimilation. In the case of Dutch-Malaccans, the refugee 
population was physically isolated from the rest of Dutch society and discouraged from 
integration because it was expected that the entire population would be repatriated to its 
native islands. The Irish Catholic population was similarly barred from the democratic 
political process by gerrymandering of political boundaries by the Protestant majority and 
discriminatory policies of local governments. When British troops deployed to restore 
security in Ireland, the military forces were perceived by Catholics to act on the side of 
the loyalist Protestants. It is notable that those second and third generations of the mass 
population (immigrants, in the case of Dutch Malaccans and Irish Catholics living under 
Protestant rule) constituted the “radicalized” populations. 
In terms of the current threat posed by Islamist ideologies, we again see that many 
second and third generations of Muslim immigrants feel socially isolated in Britain and 
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the Netherlands. Social polarization resulted in large and violent demonstrations against 
the government well before catalyzing incidents like U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan 
and, especially, the U.S. invasion of Iraq inflamed Muslim sentiment. Whereas most of 
the world understood the compelling argument to deny al Qaeda a safe haven in 
Afghanistan, the U.S. invasion of Iraq seemed to corroborate the Islamist narrative of a 
Western world bent on destroying Islam. In nations like the UK and the Netherlands, 
where second and third generations of Muslim immigrants already felt isolated and 
repressed, the “West versus Islam” narrative resonated profoundly. Because immigrant 
populations failed to integrate into broader society (or because nations failed to welcome 
immigrants to the mainstream), immigrant populations held strong affinity for their 
cultural, religious, and familial roots. Second and third generations identified more 
closely with those identities than with the culture into which they were born. Such 
cognitive dissonance provides an opening for radicalization and recruitment by Islamists.  
B. DOES THE STRATEGY ENSURE “UNITY OF EFFORT” ACROSS 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
TERRORIST CELLS? 
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands developed holistic counter-
radicalization strategies that align directly with the ideological threat. Current British and 
Dutch strategies evolved from the nations’ experience with homegrown separatist and 
ethno-nationalist terrorist groups—terrorism motivated by limited goals that allow for the 
possibility of negotiation. Both countries recognize that “new terrorism” presents a 
challenge that requires counter-radicalization strategies that have impact across many 
factors. These factors combine in a complex way to lead communities toward or away 
from radicalization and require a multidimensional approach. In effect, the OSCT and the 
NCTb address terrorism as a “system” of complex and interconnected factors. Therefore, 
a single entity within the government serves as a coordination point for a broad array of 
activities. 
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1. A Strong National Coordination Element Is Essential 
The role of the UK’s Home Office is neatly summarized in a single sentence at 
the top of its web page, “The Home Office is responsible for keeping the UK safe from 
the threat posed by terrorism.” (UK Home Office, 2010b). The NCTb is assigned two 
tasks: to “minimize the risk and fear of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands and to take 
prior measures to limit the potential impact of terrorist acts” (Netherlands. NCTb, 
2010b). The Home Office and the NCTb guide counterterrorism operations across the 
whole government. This allows the OSCT and NCTb to tailor solutions based on regional 
needs. The OSCT and the NCTb can quickly adjust enforcement, support, and messaging 
strategies in ways that are responsive to local, regional, and national requirements. No 
department of the British or Dutch governments devotes all or even most of its resources 
to counterterrorism, therefore each department has only a limited interest in the 
counterterrorism mission. The Home Office’s OSCT and the NCTb allow for certain 
elements or activities within larger government departments to focus exclusively on 
counterterrorism. The centralized, national counterterrorism component reduces 
interagency competition and conflicting intra-agency mission priorities because 
operational control of dedicated resources lies within the authority of the OSCT and the 
NCTb. 
2. Whole Government Strategies 
Beyond the ever present need for traditional human intelligence, the government’s 
ability to understand all source intelligence in the context of local community needs and 
grievances is critical. This contextualization has direct bearing on the effectiveness of 
government action to address those concerns and may increase development of 
collaborative relationships. Used constructively, good intelligence can make government 
more effective and efficient. Regional hubs for government counterterrorism efforts 
increase the continuity and translation of national objectives to local government. 
Likewise, regional hubs secure the ability of local government and communities to “send 
up the chain” messages that may inform the national government of the effect of its 
policies on domestic security matters. 
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3. Regional and Local Implementation Strategies 
To counter the terrorists’ narrative, the British and Dutch governments actively 
target and counter ideologies that support violent action to achieve political or religious 
aims, and they encourage mainstream citizens to do the same. This involves debate, 
coordinated messaging, and government agencies that have sufficient authority to take 
action that is both strong and empathetic to community concerns. To be effective, 
government personnel must be strategically placed, have a detailed understanding of local 
dynamics and be informed by a unified strategy—these requirements cannot be easily 
met by a centralized authority. Local contexts may differ from national conditions, which 
are necessarily less refined. Strategies can be devised at the national level, but they are 
always implemented locally.  
Through joint service centers like GOs and local police boards, the UK and the 
Netherlands empower all levels of government to act within the bonds of national 
strategy while providing “full-service” to communities. A joint, networked structure 
enables counterterrorism practitioners to improve their overall capacity to reduce 
radicalization and increase security (Scheider, Chapman, & Seelman, 2003). When local 
governments work with the community to diminish radicalization, the social status of 
community members is enhanced for partners who confront influences considered 
negative by the local community. 
C. DOES THE STRATEGY PROVIDE TOOLS TO SHAPE THE 
ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE IS 
WAGED? 
1. The Government Cannot “Go It Alone” 
Both British and Dutch security services recognized nongovernment agencies and 
community leaders as important parts of their counter-radicalization strategies. It is 
exceptionally difficult to disrupt the radicalization process once an individual has 
committed to Islamist ideology. Credible voices are required to intervene with a 




would respond positively to someone who can speak with religious authority and shares a 
common background than with a government agent who represents the “evil” that the 
subject might be radicalized against.  
Positive relationships with community leaders should result in media coverage 
that establishes a “mainstream” interpretation of Islam that rejects violence to obtain 
political goals. Indications of support from the community abound anecdotally, (Musaji, 
2010), although Muslim rejection of terrorism rarely receives national media coverage. A 
communications strategy that incorporates coordinated messaging between government 
and Muslim partners might ensure increased media coverage of positive news stories. 
The UK’s Prevent strategy calls directly on community leaders to actively counter 
the Islamist narrative. British programs support a variety of initiatives that are intended to 
assimilate Muslim youth into British culture. Likewise other government-supported 
programs provide platforms for communities to explore diverse cultures and perspectives. 
This may tend to diminish religious and cultural isolation, which in turn may reduce the 
likelihood of prejudice and isolation on a societal level. 
2. Building Trust with the Community 
Community policing programs introduce the opportunity for community groups to 
work with government officials to achieve “superordinate goals” (Abrams et al., 2001, p. 
64–70), with tangible results that are desirable by both groups. Superordinate goals tend 
to build cohesion and cooperation between groups, which could benefit the community 
with enhanced responsiveness to grievances and the government with increased 
cooperation and security. Positive relationships with community leaders should be 
pursued because government-community partnerships can result in three main benefits: 
• Information about community reactions and perceptions may 
identify emerging trends; 
• The feeling of consultation and partnership gives minorities the 
assurance that the government targets terrorists, not ethnicities or 
religions. It might also enlist community leaders in individual and 
collective efforts to counter terrorist narratives; and  
  80
• Trusting relationships would reassure the community that the 
police will aggressively respond to threats against the community. 
(Paris, 2007) 
3. Domain Awareness 
In order to shape the ideological battlefield, the government must have or develop 
a strong intelligence base, consisting of technical, liaison, and human collectors. Poor 
intelligence leads give military and police forces little alternative but the use of coercive 
power to ensure the security of the civilian population from terrorists. As the British 
experience at the beginning of the Troubles demonstrated, when coercive power was used 
too broadly, or in a way that could be perceived to be discriminatory, it alienated the very 
hearts and minds that the government needed to attract. The mass Catholic population 
became more isolated, and moral support for the terrorists increased. In the early years of 
the Troubles, heavy-handed policing led to more violence. Similarly, in the Netherlands, 
cordon and search operations against Mallaccan villages produced an attempt at violent 
retort. 
4. Applying Hard Power Alone Can Increase Radicalization 
The threat of an imminent terrorist attack warrants an aggressive tactical response 
to save lives and deny terrorists an opportunity to bring attention to their cause. Effective 
and efficient application of overwhelming force may serve to instill a sense of futility 
related to violent tactics. Most importantly, rapid responses are necessary to save lives, 
particularly in hostage situations or in order to disrupt terrorist operations. These points 
are well established and particularly important when facing an enemy that is bent on 
killing as many people as possible and that intends to die as part of what it views as a 
“martyrdom” operation. Such responses to tactical threats are appropriate.  
However, British experience with Catholic civil-rights protests in Northern 
Ireland and military-supported fugitive searches of Dutch-Malaccan villages taught the 
UK and the Netherlands that use of force that is perceived to be discriminatory or 
disproportional to the threat can fuel “in group/out-group” resentment. In-group/out 
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group polarization can fuel further polarization and isolation and thus may increase 
radicalization and diminish the mass population’s trust of government. 
5. Separate Terrorists and Radicalizers from the Population 
The separation of mainstream community from extremist messages need not be 
literal. By supporting voices in the community who oppose violence and denounce 
terrorism, the government can diminish the credibility of the global jihadist’s message. 
Both the British and Dutch create safe platforms for public discussion and accept 
criticism, making changes to policy where appropriate and feasible. Wholesale change 
may be particularly difficult in matters of foreign policy where local officials, and even 
locally based federal officials, have limited impact on national strategies. Nevertheless, 
these platforms for dialogue provide a mechanism for grievances to be consolidated and 
voiced as regional concerns, which likely carries more influence than those presented by 
individual citizens or special interest groups. By creating a political path for nonviolent 
Islamists, the UK and the Netherlands provide a legitimate alternative to violent 
expression. 
When separation strategies are applied literally by arresting or deporting 
radicalizers, the intent of such action should be to remove the individual(s) from society 
as quickly as possible and for an extended period (in the case of criminal proceedings) or 
permanently (deportation), thus inhibiting the radicalizer’s ability to communicate his 
violent ideology to the public.  
Fast-tracking judicial action would also obligate the government to make public 
any criminal charges against the radicalizer. Criminal activity is a violation of the state’s 
trust by the visa holder and might undermine the visiting radicalizer’s moral authority. 
Public platforms, as described above, allow a venue for the government to describe the 
reasons for its actions in an environment that promotes objective evaluation. Public 
debate might be enhanced by follow-on discussions via an interconnected and expanded 
network of contacts that do not involve the government but can understand and articulate 
the government’s perspective.  
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Under the current, multiyear process for removal and deportation, the government 
is precluded from commenting publicly on the details of a case for fear of prejudicing the 
jury pool. If speedy trial and process were implemented, the amount of time a subject can 
portray himself as a martyr would diminish, thus removing a cancer from society in its 
early stages. The government should broadly distribute information that is available to 
the public through its informal networks. By making the facts of the case known through 
a liaison platform and making counter-radicalization partners aware of press releases and 
where to find public indictments, much of the rumor of conspiracy can be mitigated. 
On a less formal basis, both government officials and local counter-radicalization 
partners should aggressively inform associates potentially affected by the arrest or 
removal about the nature of the charges. Ideally, a strong counter-radicalization network 
might distribute such information informally, by interpersonal contact and social media, 
and more quickly and effectively than mainstream media. 
D. IS THE POPULATION’S SOCIAL IDENTITY IMPACTED BY THE 
GOVERNMENT IN A WAY THAT IS POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE FOR 
NATIONAL SECURITY? 
1. “Whole Government” Efforts Should Be Designed to Support 
Counter-Narrative Messages 
The British ultimately won the “hearts and minds” of the mass population by 
providing Catholics, even some who were engaged in the terrorist campaign, a venue for 
dialogue where grievances could be openly discussed. Similarly, the Netherlands opened 
dialogue with Malaccan leaders even while violence persisted. The British and Dutch 
governments communicated simultaneously complete intolerance for violent extremism 
and a vision of peaceful coexistence. This message resonated with the population at large 
because so many had been affected by violence during 30 years of conflict. This strategic 
position shift by the UK provided a sharp contrast to the PIRA. Similarly, when the 
Dutch government opened communication channels with Malaccan separatists, who had 
increasingly used indiscriminate violence, many in the Malaccan community recognized 
that with little support for self-rule from those residing in the Molacca Islands, the 
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government in exile had no realistic chance to attain its goal. Terrorist actions thus 
became self-limiting because of their diminished ability to recruit new terrorists. 
2. Long-Term Strategies Include Priority for Integration to Larger 
Society 
Prosecuting a “battle of ideas” requires an overarching vision of the end result. 
The PIRA and Malaccan separatists were able to clearly articulate their long-term goals: 
a united and independent Ireland and an independent Malaccan state supported by the 
Netherlands, respectively. These ideas probably appealed to their core audiences—Irish 
Catholics who were subject to discrimination in Northern Ireland and Malaccan refugees 
living in the Netherlands—because the mass population viewed itself as a disadvantaged 
“out group” of the larger society and believed that actualization of the terrorists’ goals 
would improve the condition of their groups. Regardless of the true state of bias between 
government and aggrieved minority groups, the government must address perceptions to 
avoid social polarization. By entering into negotiations with dissidents, British and Dutch 
governments were able to garner influence with the mass population through surrogate 
voices within the minority groups who were inclined to wage peace. This is consistent 
with the concept that social categorization is critical to social influence (Abrams et al., 
2001, p. 286). The British and Dutch focus on building trusting relationships with 
influential members of groups; they aim to influence the mass population and provide 
high-status alternatives to those vulnerable to radicalization. Even those highly critical of 
the government can be valuable partners so long as they hold to the premises of a 
democratic society and nonviolent protest. In some cases, these individuals may actually 
be more valuable than “mainstream” Muslims because they are identified more closely 
with the subgroups most susceptible to radicalization. 
E. SUMMARY 
The UK and the Netherlands provide 
some of the most developed programmes for outreach and dialogue with 
the Muslim community, including co-ordinating councils with government 
officials and clergy, youth outreach, women’s outreach, social cohesion 
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and dialogue programmes or events to support moderation and tolerance, 
and anti-discrimination efforts.” (Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, 2009) 
Their efforts are not based on liberal philosophy, a search for self-blame, or 
altruism. Instead, objective analysis of past victories and failures in asymmetrical conflict 
allowed these learning organizations to apply lessons learned to attract the mass 
population away from violent extremism. The British and Dutch accept the prospect of a 
generations-long conflict for the hearts and minds of their own populations and have 
successfully migrated balanced power strategies across religious, ethnic, and political 
contexts. From the actions of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the United States 
might glean the framework for a successful national counterterrorism strategy, one that 
includes state, local, and nongovernment partners and introduces soft power strategies. 
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands pursue strategies that incorporate both 
aggressive law enforcement to disrupt terrorist attacks and the radicalization process 
while simultaneously pursuing an “attraction” and engagement strategies that support the 
integration of Muslims into the larger society. 
British and Dutch counterterrorism orientations evolved from a reactive 
“response” framework to one that proactively addresses the causal factors of terrorist 
attacks. The British and the Dutch viewed their homegrown terrorist threats as something 
more meaningful than individual attacks. Current British and Dutch approaches express 
strategic goals to minimize the polarization of their societies through both hard and soft 
power tactics. To do this effectively, the governments must first understand both the 
grievances of the mass population and the measures that can impact the target 
community.  
Before the capacity to understand the causal factors of domestic radicalization can 
be developed, it is necessary to view counterterrorism as “system management” and to 
open a dialogue with the community. This approach logically leads to a unified mission 
that can be managed at a national level but must be implemented more locally. It leads to 
“deep security” (Ramo, 2009). 
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Through their regional, networked structure, the UK and the Netherlands have 
“bureaucratized” the exercise of imagination and developed an ability to manipulate the 
environment that can produce radicalization—or tolerance. Regional hubs of the 
counterterrorism effort in both the UK and the Netherlands tailor local strategies to local 
challenges, inform national policy makers of emerging domestic threats, and share best 
practices through a networked structure. This process enhances both regional capabilities 
and organizational adaptability. The regular rotation of developing leaders through joint-
service regional offices ensures that fresh ideas reach national counterterrorism 
leadership and creates a culture of “jointness.” These structures and processes may tend 
to immunize the UK and the Netherlands from “failures of imagination, policy, 
capabilities and management,” the four underlying conditions that the 9/11 Commission 
described as the fundamental failures that resulted in the terrorist attacks of September 11 
(Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 339), and may inform a range of activities and relationships 
that impact national security through the exercise of well-measured balanced power. The 
UK and Dutch counterterrorism apparatus has become a complex adaptive system.15  
                                                 
15 Ramo discusses “deep security” as an ability to manipulate environmental factors rather than be 
surprised by their impact, thus ensuring resilience to unexpected changes. Ramo compares homeland 
security to the “sandpile physics” of Danish scientist Per Bak, who suggested that “complex behavior in 
nature reflects the tendency of large systems to evolve into a poised ‘critical’ state, way out of balance, 
where minor disturbances may lead to events, called avalanches, of all sizes” (Ramo, 2009, p. 49). Ramo 
suggests that slow-moving environmental factors in society—like polarization—underlie major social 
changes—like revolution. 
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VI. ENGAGING IN THE WAR OF IDEAS 
He who does not trust enough, will not be trusted. 
-Lao Tzu 
A. ORIENTATION TO THE BATTLE OF IDEAS 
A precondition for success in the ideological confrontation that is being waged in 
the United States is an understanding of the American Muslim perspective as it pertains 
to local and individual contexts. The government must accept that “the key to tackling 
Islamist fundamentalism and terrorism from the Islamist community is in the hands of 
moderate Muslims” (EurActiv Network, 2005). Counterterrorists must develop trusting 
alliances with Muslim leaders from this group without compromising the credibility of 
counter-radicalization partners. But before setting out to build liaison, decision makers 
should consider why the Islamist narrative reverberates in America and the contextual 
perspective of potential recruits. Moderate Muslims can provide great insight to the 
conservative and ultraconservative fringes of Islam, but the government must move 
beyond easy and amiable conversations to deal with radicalism. An understanding of the 
psychological and cultural influences that underpin radicalization should inform counter-
radicalization strategies and may assist in anticipating the challenges and opportunities 
that lie ahead. Ultimately, the goal of engagement is to attract (or keep) the mass 
population’s loyalty and to diminish the development or recruitment of more terrorists. It 
is therefore necessary to assess Muslim perspectives at both the strategic and the tactical 
level.  
1. Where Did All These Radicals Come From? 
It is incumbent for the national security community to look to primary sources 
rather than political spin when they assess the threat. Bin Laden began talking about his 
“beliefs, goals, and intentions” and speaking to journalists in 1993 (Scheuer, 2006), 
declared war on the United States in 1996 (bin Laden, 1996), and in 1998 he delineated 
three basic grievances against the United States (Bin Laden, et al., 1998): 
• The United States’ occupation of Islamic holy lands, 
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• Americans’ murderous humiliation of Muslims, and 
• The United States’ support for Israel. 
While many Americans would disagree with bin Laden’s characterizations, 
argument is irrelevant: bin Laden made an emotional appeal simultaneously to Muslims, 
Arabs, and anti-Zionists, in form true to the character of a Type-A terrorist, one who is 
uncompromising and to whom negotiation will not appeal (Davis & Jenkins, 2002). For 
his audience, the September 11 attacks redeemed al Qaeda’s honor and completed the 
previously disappointing performance of its premier operators, senior al Qaeda operations 
planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). KSM’s nephew Ramzi Yousef had 
previously exploded a vehicle-borne bomb in the garage of the World Trade Towers that 
killed six people, but “said later that he had hoped to kill 250,000 people” (Kean & 
Hamilton, 2004, p. 72).  
In the years since September 11, the West versus Islam ideology may have 
influenced many whom bin Laden sought to recruit to retaliate for what many Muslims 
consider “violations of their rights and demands for expanded rights” (Moghaddam, 
2008, p. 122). It is likely that this sense of injustice was pronounced among Muslims with 
familial and historical ties to Muslim—majority countries and those who already 
considered the policies of the United States to be “unjust” or who might come to feel so 
due to perceived unfair treatment (Kohut, 2003). With bin Laden in the lead, Islamists 
had begun to retaliate for the humiliation that resonated in his 1998 manifesto.  
According to group dynamics theory the American reaction to the September 11 
attacks was predictable. The surprise attacks undermined feelings of security at both an 
individual and national level and resulted in a high degree of uncertainty about the future. 
Where and when would the terrorists attack next? The attackers had moved freely 
amongst the general population, in some cases for years. Which among the current 
population might also be a terrorist?  
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, members of Muslim and Arab groups 
found themselves the victims of discrimination, alienation, and prejudice, both from their 
fellow Americans and at the hands of various government organizations. A grievance  
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cycle had begun. In response to violent racism and prejudice, some Arab- and Muslim-
Americans developed (or had reinforced) a social identity more closely affiliated with 
their religion or ethnicity than their nationality.  
This type of social categorization is formed by contrast with other categories 
(Hogg, 2005, pp. 203–06). Because 65% of American Muslims were born elsewhere and 
more than 39% of this group immigrated to the United States in the last 20 years (Pew 
Research Center, 2007), it is likely that many individuals within this population identify 
more closely with the populations in regions where the United States is engaged in 
military conflict. After all, in many cases, family and extended family, tribal or clan 
affiliations, ethnic similarities, and language provide a basis to identify with others from 
those regions. Therefore, it is likely that a more pronounced identification with “Muslim-
ness” than “American-ness” is found in insular immigrant communities.  
Immigrants lacking strong English language skills or who demure from the 
American mainstream culture are most vulnerable to the cultivation of in-group/out-
group narratives and are more likely to accept stereotyping of the out-group (the larger 
out-group of secularized, non-Muslim population, and particularly the police and federal 
agencies) because people engage in what they perceive as “strategically self-enhancing or 
self-protective identification” (Abrams and Hogg, 2005, p. 160). The negative 
experiences that many American Muslims have endured in the wake September 11, due 
to mutually limited positive interaction with the non-Arab, non-Muslim population, tend 
to reinforce in-group/out-group polarization. As individual in-group/out-group 
categorization increased in the United States and around the world after the attacks on 
New York and Washington, the threat posed by al Qaeda morphed from an externally 
based “jihadi organization with a chain of command to a jihadi movement—an ideology 
motivating dispersed groups internationally” (Paris, 2007).  
Increasing polarization and the threat to social order was fueled by expanding 
violence from both “global jihadists” and Western military action. Thus, the Islamist call 
from bin Laden extended well beyond his associates to the United States and other 
Western nations, where it threatens homeland security and social order through the 
potential progression of continuing ethnic and religious conflict. 
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2. Barriers to Prevention 
The global jihadi-Salafi16 movement poses a significant challenge to law 
enforcement and intelligence since the radicalization phenomenon that drives it is 
indiscriminate and its indicators are subtle. Whether an individual is being radicalized is 
hard to detect, especially in the early stages, unless those close to the radicalizing person 
understand that changes in behavior could signal danger. Too often, these behavioral cues 
are recognized by those closest to the terrorist only in retrospect. The most promising 
commonality of Western “jihadists” is that the terrorists encountered a “spiritual 
sanctioner” who assisted their progression by bridging the self-identification and 
indoctrination phases of radicalization (Bhatt and Silber, 2007). This is a likely point to 
identify those vulnerable to recruitment to violent extremism. This is also the principal 
reason it behooves the counterterrorist to develop allies in the ranks of those who are 
positioned to have contact with individuals seeking spiritual guidance. In a hard power–
only paradigm, these relationships are unlikely to form. This is troubling because it may 
also be the first and last opportunity for the law enforcement community to spot and 
intervene in the radicalization process before the recruit is a lost cause. 
A truly preventive policy requires intervention well before Silber and Bhatt’s 
“indoctrination” phase. Fathali Moghaddam suggests that whether or not an individual 
becomes a terrorist depends on societal conditions that influence how a person perceives 
his or her personal and collective identities (Moghaddam, 2006, pp. 45–46). In the United 
States, the Muslim population carries cultural and emotional residue from the traditional 
home of the immigrant population’s sources that range broadly from Europe to Indonesia. 
Converts to Islam present a particularly worrisome context. As in the cases of John 
Walker Lindh, Jose Padilla, Daniel Boyd, and others, these neophytes in Islam have an 
inherently limited understanding of the religion and a limited understanding of nuanced  
                                                 
16 Silber and Bhatt describe this ideology as “the acceptance of a religious-political worldview that 
justifies, legitimizes, encourages, or supports violence against anything kufr, or un-Islamic, including the 
West, its citizens, its allies, or other Muslims whose opinions are contrary to the extremist agenda…. 
[R]ather than seeking and striving for the more mainstream goals of getting a good job, earning money, and 
raising a family, the indoctrinated radical’s goals are non-personal and focused on achieving ‘the greater 
good.’ The individual’s sole objective centers around the Salafi aim of creating a pure fundamentalist 
Muslim community worldwide” (2007, p. 21–22). 
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theological arguments that underpin al Qaeda’s religious justification for terrorism; they 
are therefore unable to critically evaluate the guidance provided by the “religious 
authorities” to which they subscribe.  
In many cases, hypocrisy in the foreign policy of the United States (real or 
perceived), paired with negative experiences with security services in their historical 
homelands and in the United States immediately after September 11, have resulted in 
diminished trust between the government and American Muslims. This mistrust must be 
overcome in order to build partnerships to combat violent extremist ideologies.  
Polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims complicates this challenge. Non-
Muslim Americans are  
galvanized by terrorist attacks and suicide bombings in Iraq, Israel, 
Palestine, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia … while the Muslim world 
is galvanized by the occupation of Iraq, abuses at Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo, and images of civilian deaths and destruction.” (Esposito 
and Mogahed, 2007, p. 65) 
As a result, many Muslim communities feel isolated, and Muslim leaders may be 
suspicious of law enforcement and have concern regarding potential discrimination, 
misuse of information, and unfair treatment of individuals they might identify as 
vulnerable to radicalization.17 Such concerns may be exacerbated or exploited by some 
advocacy groups and opportunists who discourage Muslims from engaging independently 
with law enforcement and warn against contact with the government unless legal counsel 
is present (Council on American-Islamic Relations [CAIR], 2010).  
3. The Resonating Islamist Narrative 
The decision to engage in terrorism is a personal one, made within an 
individualized context: it is difficult and maybe impossible to predict who is or may 
become susceptible to the call of violent extremism. The messages that are common to 
                                                 
17 This observation is supported by the recent survey of Muslim attitudes in the Houston area. 
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statements published by al Qaeda18 and the statements of self-identified or convicted 
violent extremists reveal basic ideas that are used to recruit some Muslims to violence. 
For instance, the failed Christmas Day bomber, Abdulmutallab, recently published his 
second edition of Inspire magazine, an English-language Internet publication. In this 
magazine, Awlaki posits that the West is completely incompatible with the Muslim world 
and seeks to recruit individuals living in the West to “jihad” in order to fulfill what he 
interprets to be a religious duty—killing those who do not follow (his interpretation of) 
Islam (Joscelyn, 2010). Awlaki further encourages others to kill by using a “pickup truck 
‘as a mowing machine, not to mow grass, but mow down the enemies of God’ ” 
(Aljazeera, 2010).  
Another recent example of the resonating Islamist narrative was presented by 
Faisal Shazad (who pleaded guilty to trying to explode a vehicle bomb in New York’s 
Times Square on May 1, 2010) at his sentencing appearance on October 3, 2010. Shazad 
advised the presiding judge and the American public:  
We are only Muslims trying to defend our religion, people, homes and 
land, but if you call us terrorists, then we are proud terrorists and we will 
keep on terrorizing you until you leave our lands and people at peace. 
(Hays & Neumeister, 2010).  
In this instance and others like it, the fundamental theme that motivates Muslims 
to violent extremism is that Islam and Muslims are under attack by the West (and 
especially the United States)—a classic in-group/out-group framing that might easily 
appeal to a population isolated from the general public (or one that chooses to isolate 
itself) because of religious and in many cases ethnic differences. When an individual 
adopts this worldview, which might be reinforced by (real or imagined) experiences of 
persecution or victimization of self or group, he (or she) is susceptible to a call to violent 
protest or retribution for perceived injustice.  
For those who complete the radicalization journey, the result is marked by  
                                                 
18 For a more detailed review of al Qaeda statements, video, and other al Qaeda propaganda, see the 
Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation (NEFA Foundation) website at http://www.nefafoundation.org, 
which provides an extensive list of al Qaeda propaganda. 
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an impassioned, personal call to duty in defense of an embattled Islamic 
community spread around the globe, held to be under attack by the United 
States and its infidel accomplices…. The aim is nothing less than global 
holy war, leading to a new order—powerful, puritanical, and unified—
throughout the Muslim world. (Gompert, 2007) 
Those who adhere to such Islamist narratives pose a potential threat to the United 
States. Examples of homegrown terrorism over the past two years vividly demonstrate 
that individuals and groups within the United States are susceptible to the influence of 
Islamist political philosophy that proposes violence to resolve political grievances and 
misrepresents Islam to justify those acts. It is therefore easy to understand the 
government’s desire to interdict proponents of this philosophy even when, within certain 
limits,19 their freedom of speech is protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States.  
B. IMPERATIVE FOR BALANCED POWER 
The challenge for the counterterrorist then, is to disrupt the radicalization process, 
to find ways of interfering with this narrative, and to develop a process whereby those 
vulnerable to the appeal of violent extremism can be attracted away from the destructive 
course early in the process. To be effective in the battle of ideas, the national security 
apparatus needs a balanced counterterrorism strategy—one that employs both hard and 
soft power. 
Lessons learned in the UK and the Netherlands, as well as in asymmetrical 
conflicts overseas, demonstrate the complexity of the government’s dilemma in 
confronting radicalization:  
If they crack down too hard, they risk alienating the population and 
creating support for organizations where none previously existed. Failure 
to crack down, however, can decrease confidence in the state and make it 
easier for proto-insurgent [or terrorist] groups to mobilize would-be 
followers, since they need not fear that they will be arrested. In addition, a 
weak crackdown may lead rival communities to act on their own. If a  
 
                                                 
19 For detailed exploration of First Amendment case law and prohibitions on free speech, see Legal 
Information Institute, Cornell Law School (particularly “Government Restraint of Content of Expression”), 
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/amdt1toc_user.html  
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group is singled out for repression because of its ethnicity, religion, or 
other features, the salience of that identity increases. (Byman, 2007, p. 21–
22)  
In a liberal democracy, a repressive “crack down” is neither advisable nor 
desirable and in fact runs counter to Constitutional ideals. It is important for the 
government to distinguish between activities that pose a physical threat to lives or 
national security and activity that might encourage radicalization—progression toward 
terrorist activity. It is incumbent on the government to interdict terrorist activity with hard 
power whenever a threat to public safety or national security is imminent, but even in 
these cases, soft power can be applied to influence community response by sharing 
factual information about the arrest. 
Law enforcement provides an avenue to disrupt speech that promotes violence or 
supports the terrorist narrative, but hard power is rarely the only option for addressing 
such a threat. Hard power may regularly be the least preferred method of dealing with a 
radicalizer. As mentioned above, intelligence collection around those identified as radical 
and charismatic influencers can provide an opportunity to identify those who pose the 
threat of physical attacks. Unless exercised in an effort to disrupt an imminent attack, the 
application of hard power should be carefully considered in terms of balancing the extent 
of the disruption against the ability to collect intelligence. Law enforcement action that 
might be characterized as petty or harassing may temporarily disrupt the influencer’s 
activity but could also increase the influencer’s status, allowing him to be portrayed as a 
martyr, increase his ability to raise funds, and draw sympathy from those with whom the 
West-versus-Islam narrative resonates. Hard power should instead be applied in cases 
where strategic interests can be met and the radicalizer can be permanently disrupted or 
deported.  
A nuanced understanding of how to shape the social context of the ideological 
conflict is therefore a necessary precondition to a counter-radicalization strategy. For this 
reason, a successful national security strategy for counter-radicalization must place heavy 
emphasis on the judgment of regional and local authorities—and these authorities must 
be responsible for developing relationships that can influence ideological environment. 
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For example, such activity might be reasonably applied in the visa process in the 
United States. When foreign visitors promote or encourage violence against the United 
States or its allies as a legitimate method of political or religious expression, the “right” 
to visit might reasonably and immediately be terminated and the visitor deported without 
lengthy administrative process. Subsequent judicial consideration of asylum claims might 
be expedited to logical conclusion. By expediting these processes, the potential polarizing 
rhetoric of such a visitor (claims of prejudice and repression of Muslims by the 
government) could be limited, his credibility undermined, and the antagonistic visitor 
separated from the mass population. This action, revocation of the “right” to visit the 
United States, represents an aggressive hard power action that should only be taken after 
consideration of the subject’s impact on the local Muslim population. 
Alternatively, soft power tactics might accomplish the same goal by diminishing 
the status and credibility of the violent extremist messenger (and thus negatively 
impacting the visitor’s influence and appeal to those vulnerable to recruitment), without 
generating new hostility from the Muslim community toward the government. In this 
scenario, empowered leaders of the Muslim community might pressure peer groups 
through internal politics to counter the Islamist messenger publicly on both a social and 
theological level. Rejection of the imam by his peer group might “lead the individual to 
move away from the group” because of his lowered self-esteem, and it might tend to 
diminish the radical imam’s appeal to his followers by undermining his credibility and 
social status (Tajfel, 1981).  
It is likely that such rejection from the community would not be absolute, and 
while the radical imam would have less appeal to a broad audience, he might still 
maintain influence in small social circles. This is an opportune time for the government 
to exercise hard power because the disruption of the radical’s activity would be more 
palatable to the broad community. Counter-radicalization partners would play key 
messaging roles in such circumstances and would likely be highly motivated to do so 
because the accusation of the criminal activity on the part of the radicalizing imam would 
serve to reinforce the credibility and status of his former peer group. 
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1. Where to Begin: American Muslim Perspectives 
Considering that only 35% of American Muslims were born in the United States, 
and that 56% are under the age of 40 (Pew Research Center, 2007, p. 16), the Muslim 
population’s cultural immersion in the United States and its opportunities to assimilate or 
fully integrate with the general public is relatively limited, when compared to the Muslim 
experience in Europe and to other waves of migration in the United States. The events of 
September 11 also impacted the American Muslim experience and increased social 
isolation. At the individual level, American Muslims express suspicion of government 
agencies and perceive sanctioned and systematic bias due to increased security protocol. 
Community roundtable discussions by the FBI and DHS revealed “frustration with what 
they [American Muslims] considered to be government profiling or discrimination on the 
basis of ethnicity or religion” (USDOJ, 2009b)20. To many Muslims,  
it is clear that measures adopted by the government have had a profound 
impact on Muslims living in the United States. These measures have 
already disrupted the lives of thousands and left them in the grip of 
constant apprehension; they also have impeded the entry and full 
participation of the American Muslim community in the public square. 
(Haddad & Ricks, 2009, p. 6)  
The continued perception of bias and discrimination so many years after 
September 11 is particularly disconcerting from a security standpoint. Because the 
American Muslim population is young, the United States stands to face increasing 
numbers of young Muslims who experience an identity crisis over the next decade. Based 
on patterns observed in Europe, and particularly in the UK and the Netherlands, it is 
logical to project similar security challenges in the United States from some second- and 
third-generation Muslims as they grow up in a polarized context.  
Muslim leaders who have been interviewed in the Houston area almost 
unanimously identify the need to educate the Muslim American community about 
government agencies—and the need to educate government agents, especially law 
enforcement and security agencies, regarding Islam and cultural sensitivities. 
                                                 
20 This frustration has been repeatedly and consistently expressed in interviews and successive 
roundtables by DHS and the FBI in the Houston area. Concerns are often specifically associated with 
screening processes at airports and ports of entry. 
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Encouragingly, these same conservative imams report that they are willing to cooperate 
with the government by hosting and providing training, and in some cases they have 
demonstrated willingness to report even members of their self-defined “group” that they 
believe to be “radicalized.” This cooperation, however, is contingent on trusting 
relationships. Notably, not all those interviewed held positive views of the government, 
security, or law enforcement—but where positive assessments were reported, the most 
important factor defining the relationships was the amount of contact between 
government agents and the individual leader.21 
2. Building a Network 
In order to counter and confront Islamist ideology, it is important for the United 
States to look within its own borders (as well as externally) to identify radicalizing 
influences. “Intermediaries—charismatic individuals—often help persuade previously 
law-abiding citizens to radicalize or even become violent jihadists. Social networks, 
virtual or actual, support and reinforce the decisions individuals make as they embrace 
violent jihad as does perusal of online materials” (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010, p.6). But 
perhaps more importantly at the regional and local levels, the security apparatus should 
assess and identify potential partners who have much higher influence with other 
Muslims than government agents. In turn, these alliances might be leveraged to have 
strategic impact. 
Consistent with academic research, the UK and the Netherlands often initiate in-
group/out-group contact privately between individual representatives of the government 
and the Muslim community, where intergroup influence is diminished and open dialogue 
can result in partnerships. Subsequent messaging to the Muslim in-group by counter-
radicalization partners who lead ethnic or religious groups or subgroups might be more 
effective if conducted publically, because public in-group messaging can assist in 
establishing group normative behavior (Abrams et al., 2001, p. 270). 
Data collected about Muslim attitudes at the international, national, and local 
levels indicate an imperative for the government to significantly increase direct 
                                                 
21 Survey of self-described conservative imams in the Houston area. 
  98
interaction between government agents charged with enforcement responsibilities and the 
American Muslim population because face-to-face contact can be effective in improving 
intergroup relations if the contact occurs under cooperative conditions (Wilder, 2001, 
p. 379).  
Notably, Wilder’s research also indicates that intergroup contact is more likely to 
change “in-group” (Muslim) attitudes toward the “out-group” (government) if the 
individual government agent is perceived as “typical” of the out-group. This tends to 
contradict the notion that it is advantageous to create a workforce that “looks like” the 
vulnerable group. Individuals designated to represent the government in face-to-face, 
cooperative contacts need not look or speak like the Muslim in-group; in fact, in order to 
change Muslim attitudes about government agencies, the use of “atypical” representatives 
may have little effect, as the atypical representative will be viewed as an anomaly within 
the government agency and will thus be unable to shift opinions of the government 
because he/she varies from the stereotype (Wilder, 2001, pp. 379–80).  
It is essential that face-to-face contact be initiated between leaders of both the 
Muslim community and government agencies in order to establish credibility and 
commensurate status—a form of intergroup dialogue between individuals of similar 
perceived status. Leader-to-leader contact, in effect, could create a new in-group of 
counter-radicalization partners who are perceived to have reciprocal influence. In a sense, 
such a group of leaders could function as its own tribal alliance.  
3. Centers of Influence 
Developing interpersonal relationships between government leaders and Muslim 
centers of influence is therefore a critical first step in building a network that can address 
ideological challenges. To diminish the appeal of terrorism, it is necessary to redefine the 
national effort to identify and fully engage with centers of influence of at-risk and 
immigrant Muslim populations. These referent leaders have more credibility with their 
“in-group” than government agents and can therefore more effectively communicate the 
moral and theological foundations of an alternative ideology to Islamist extremists. With 
this influence, potential recruits might stall or reverse their progression toward terrorism 
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and affiliation with terrorist ideologies in order to maintain positive self-esteem and 
acceptance by the normative “in-group” (Ethier and Deaux, 2001, pp. 254–69). 
The organizational model further suggests that some group leaders may be willing 
to adjust their personal goals to secure the loyalty of followers, recruit new members, or 
appeal to group members’ needs. This provides opportunities for the engaged 
counterterrorist. If one takes a cognitive approach to building relationships with centers 
of influence and leverages individual needs against the psychological need for positive 
self-esteem, it is possible to diminish the influence of radicalizing agents. In terms of 
asymmetrical conflict, this approach separates the ideological insurgent from the mass 
population. 
In some cases22 these centers of influence, often imams, leaders within a mosque 
or influential nongovernment agencies or associations, express a personal desire and 
religious obligation to counsel individuals away from the path of violent extremism and 
toward a more mainstream interpretation of Islam (Elibiary, 2010). Self-policing by the 
Muslim community is important and might be effective, although only self-reported and 
anecdotal information is available to support this claim. Nevertheless, according to the 
secretary of DHS, there are many cases where community leaders “helped disrupt plots 
and have spoken out against violent extremism. They play a central role in addressing 
this issue” (Napolitano, 2010). Muslim leaders must recognize that the risk of self-
policing is literally a risk of life and death. Trusting relationships between the 
government and these centers of influence are likely to increase their willingness to bring 
radicalizing individuals, as well as individuals who “drop out” of the mainstream 
religious education, to the attention of law enforcement early in the radicalization 
process.  
Because the credibility of in-group leaders is higher than government officials 
within the in-group, centers of influence can also be valuable partners in the wake of 
terrorist acts or government application of hard power (arrests). By communicating 
planned government actions to investigate a terrorist act, government agents might 
                                                 
22 Based on a survey of conservative Muslim leaders in the Houston area. 
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increase cooperation from the community by informing community leaders of the reason 
for the interviews and seeking the community leaders’ input regarding any specific 
cultural sensitivity that might reduce cooperation. In the event of an arrest of a 
community member, communication with local leaders immediately after the arrest 
would allow unclassified facts of a given case to be disseminated via an interpersonal 
network that could mitigate messaging from those who would intentionally sow discord 
and the Islamist narrative. 
C. SOFT POWER REQUIREMENTS 
The fundamental requirement for a successful soft power strategy is trust. Trust 
should be developed through sustained, regular interaction. The larger the network of 
trusting relationships, the more influence the network can have. If for no other reason 
than this, government agents at all levels have a vested interest in and obligation to build 
trusting relationships with the Muslim community. Federal statutes address civil liberties, 
counterterrorism, Patriot Act authorities, immigration, and international travel—all issues 
at the forefront of concern for Muslim community leaders.23 State and local officials like 
mayors, health and human service agencies, fire departments, public health, and 
emergency management officials also have a vested interest to succeed in building trust 
with the Muslim community because terrorism and radicalization can affect safety and 
quality of life in their states and communities. State and local officials are critical to the 
success of such efforts because of their regular interaction with the Muslim community. 
These government representatives must be willing to listen, seek to understand 
grievances, and constructively address those grievances where possible.  
D. DIALOGUE AND INFLUENCE 
Differences of opinion during engagement should be expected, and even 
encouraged, since rational discussion of terrorism can only assist the argument for 
nonviolent protest. Varying viewpoints will also likely derive from different ethnic  
 
                                                 
23 Recent survey by the FBI of Muslim community leaders in the Houston area. 
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groups and religious sects. In addressing Islamist group leadership or public forums, law 
enforcement officers should focus on each of the three levels identified in social identity 
theory: 
Cognitive: Those speaking to a group that has grievances should 
emphasize that the audience and the speaker respect the same “American” 
group goals (preventing political violence, diminishing radicalization, 
increasing tolerance in society). 
Evaluative: In discussing terrorism, concentrate on discussion of illegal or 
repugnant acts, i.e., targeting civilians with violence, matters that clearly 
conflict with “American” group goals. 
Emotional: Reinforce feelings of accomplishment by recounting the 
government-community joint efforts toward “American” goals 
(community assistance in disruption of terrorist activity, law enforcement 
investigation of civil rights complaints, social or interfaith projects. 
Engagement by government leaders with the Muslim community—even those 
who may harbor hostile or aggrieved feelings toward the government or law 
enforcement—should be a principal responsibility of government leaders responsible for 
counterterrorism missions. Regular and sustained engagement can result in a process of 
“recategorization (bringing members of two categories together under an inclusive, 
superordinate one), and decategorization (dissolving the problematic categories 
altogether, especially by facilitating contact between members of rival groups)” 
(Brannan, Esler, & Strindberg, 2001, p. 19). 
In many instances, the immigrant population that arrives in the United States has 
migrated out of respect for the individual freedoms and opportunities provided by a free, 
capitalistic society. They also, however, carry with them an inherent distrust of 
intelligence and police officers, based on their experiences in their native countries where 
national authorities have great power and a different perspective on security. This 
apprehension must be overcome, and relationships with local leaders can dramatically 
assist the government. One misstep can set back these interpersonal relationships, which 
is why it is important for government contact to be consistent and sustained. The outreach 
effort is more than just “community policing.” The suggested approach for the 
counterterrorist is at an operational, rather than tactical level. Efforts in this arena should 
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be a major police effort that is coordinated with and supported by JTTF managers and 
intelligence analysts. Community leaders must be made aware of intragovernment 
communication—which is to be expected if those interested in counter-radicalization 
seek to effect positive change from both the community and the government. Joint 
community efforts can complement one another to gain three main benefits: 
• Information about community reactions and perceptions may 
identify emerging trends; 
• The feeling of consultation and partnership gives minorities the 
assurance that they are not the target and enlists their capacities to 
demonstrate individual and collective civic responsibilities; and  
• The community knows that the police will forcefully clamp down 
on any backlash from non-Muslims . 
Beyond these three benefits, and only when carefully considered, relationships 
built with community leaders can provide additional tools for counter-radicalization 
efforts. When groups lend themselves to an organizational model,  
government policies and operations should encourage terrorism to limit 
itself and decline … particularly the case in the United States where the 
government enjoys support and legitimacy. The objective is to exploit 
terrorist’s weakness, their lack of resources, by depriving them of public 
support that would allow them to increase their resources (Tucker, n.d.)  
Al Qaeda and like-minded groups can be defeated, and violent extremism can be 
mitigated, but not by coercive power alone. Those charged with the counterterrorism 
mission should incorporate soft-power tactics in national, regional, and local approaches 
to terrorism in order to attract partners from nongovernment and religious organizations 
who have high credibility for messaging and greater access to potential terrorists early in 
the radicalization process.  
In reciprocal form, the benefit of dialogue and the exchange of ideas garnered 
through community outreach might be increased by involving Muslim leaders in the 
education of government officials who have regular contact with the community. Such 
involvement would demonstrate the government’s willingness to consider community 
concerns, increase the status of those centers of influence that are willing to engage with 
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the government within their own in-group, increase job performance of government 
officials, and help refine contextual understanding of behaviors at the individual level. 
Combining increased contact between the government and the Muslim 
community, and messages with actions that demonstrate a sincere intent to understand the 
communities’ issues, to “serve and protect” both the Muslim community and national 
security, can be a powerful force to increase trust because this combination has the power 
to deconstruct negative stereotypes (Brewer & Gaertner, 2005, pp. 307–8). The prospect 
of collaborative relationships with the Muslim community promises to undermine the 
resonance of the West versus Islam narrative, increase government understanding of 
radicalizing influences as societal phenomena, as well as a threat, and increase Muslim 
communities’ confidence that Islam and democratic society are compatible.  
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VII. APPLYING THE LESSONS 
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but 
indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. In battle, there 
are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet 
these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. The 
direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a 
circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of 
their combination? 
-Sun Tzu 
A. STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT 
The counterterrorism strategy of the United States is misaligned with the evolving 
threat from terrorism. After an extensive review of the circumstances surrounding the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the first reflection by the 9/11 Commission was that “in 
the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by fault lines within societies than by 
territorial boundaries between them” (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 361). This observation 
should serve as a foundation for developing a national strategy to address the root cause 
of homegrown terrorism: societal polarization. The bipartisan commission issued its 
findings with multiple observations, opinions, and recommendations, summarized in a 
single sentence: “We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in 
imagination, policy, capabilities, and management” (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 339). 
The NCTC and DHS were created to enhance the nation’s ability to synthesize, 
analyze, and coordinate operations, but the structure of these organizations does not 
facilitate coordination outside of Washington. Neither NCTC nor DHS have strong and 
authoritative mechanisms to coordinate activities at the operational level, where 
implementation occurs. Because they have little footprint outside of Washington, these 
entities can do little to that ensure strategic plans and policies are implemented 
throughout the country, particularly across federal and state jurisdictions. Neither NCTC 
nor DHS has an overarching counterterrorism strategy or coordination authority that 
reaches to the local level.  
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The FBI coordinates counterterrorism investigations via a network of JTTFs, but 
JTTF strategies have emphasized mitigation of existing threats, rather than underlying 
social conditions that result in radicalization. With 56 field offices and more than 100 
JTTFs, the span of control for the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division and its Directorate of 
Intelligence (which provides analysis and intelligence) is exceptionally broad. This 
condition can yield high degrees of uncertainty (Keren & Levhari, 1979, p. 1168). Each 
field office is currently developing its own strategy, absent an overarching vision and 
without coordination among DHS component agencies.  
The same lack of coordination is evident between the federal government and 
state and local agencies, which do not coordinate strategies across agencies, departments, 
and jurisdictions in a way that produces mass effect—though in some instances, mass of 
force is achieved (for instance when manpower is shifted to a border region). 
As suggested by the 9/11 Report, the United States ought to “engage in the 
struggle of ideas.” But in keeping with the external focus that permeated the government 
response, the 9/11 Report recommended only external measures (Kean & Hamilton, 
2004, p. 375–79) toward that end. In the nine years since al Qaeda’s attacks on the 
homeland, the United States has not ventured into the ideological arena in any 
meaningful way. Between 2002 and 2008, 81 individuals were indicted on terrorism 
related charges, “an average of about 12 individuals a year. But in 2009 alone, 42 people 
were indicted for jihadist-related crimes” (Jenkins, 2010). While the United States faced 
outward and employed mostly a hard-power response, violent ideologies have been 
allowed to foment at home.  
During the same period, clusters—or groups or cells—of would-be terrorists in 
Houston, Texas; Raleigh, North Carolina; and Alexandria, Virginia had their plans to join 
violent extremists fighting the United States military overseas disrupted by arrests. It is 
easy to imagine such groups making the determination that they might be more valuable 
to their cause by attacking targets in the United States. It is not clear why these 
Americans chose to fight abroad rather than domestically. The United States can be 
thankful for this subtlety but should not depend on it. 
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In contrast to the approach taken by the United States, soon after domestic attacks 
by al Qaeda and its affiliates in the UK and the Netherlands, British and Dutch security 
services looked inward—not for the purpose of self-blame, but to consider the potential 
for extended social conflict within their own societies.  
National security components of both nations studied their own population and 
considered the approach of other nations (Archick, 2008) and developed holistic 
strategies to bring the full force of government to bear in an ideological struggle against 
violent Islamist ideologies. Then the British and the Dutch devised or expanded 
networked structures to support the strategy and designated a central authority—
ultimately one person—to be responsible for coordinating and supporting the 
counterterrorism effort. Their networked structures incorporate hard- and soft-power 
strategies that include local authorities and community leaders, tailor government action 
to local contexts, and share best practices. 
Whole government strategies that employ soft power require a framework that 
supports actions to simultaneously eliminate, reduce, increase, and create contexts that 
influence radicalization. A coordinated effort that broadly impacts society is absent from 
the United States’ domestic counterterrorism effort. Actions along these axes might be 
realized through effective implementation of a holistic strategy in the homeland. 
In the UK and the Netherlands, broad approaches to counterterrorism provide an 
attractive alternative to hard-power-only strategies. Principal benefits of balanced 
strategy include: 
• Information about community reactions and perceptions may identify 
emerging trends; 
• Consultation and partnership between government and the Muslim 
community provides the assurance that terrorist activity, not the Muslim 
community, is the target of investigation. Consultation and partnership 
also enlists the community’s capacity to demonstrate civic responsibilities; 
and  
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• The community knows that the police will forcefully clamp down on any 
backlash from non-Muslims. (Paris, 2007) 
 
 
Figure 3.   Approaches to Counterterrorism 
B. DEVELOP A TRULY PREVENTIVE STRATEGY 
The counterterrorism structure of the United States does not adequately support a 
preventive counter-radicalization strategy because it provides neither assurance that an 
overarching strategy is implemented at the local level nor a mechanism for collaboration 
between governments, the public, and religious organizations to address grievances of 
local and national concern. 
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Regional, networked structures facilitate the exercise of imagination in learning 
organizations because lessons from localized experiences can be shared broadly and 
adjusted or improved in other locales. In turn, this can inform national policy makers of 
emerging domestic threats and, at the national level, trends can be identified—allowing 
for projective analysis. This structure and process, particularly in an age of electronic 
communication, serves to enhance both regional capabilities and organizational 
adaptability without diminishing access to valuable information or compliance matters at 
the central coordination point (Ellis et al., 2003).  
Without a strong, unified command, it is exceptionally challenging for individual 
departments and agencies to act together. The NCTC and a homeland security council 
might serve as logical apex organizations to create such a strategy. At the regional and 
local levels, a dedicated multiagency staff might effectively coordinate cross-agency 
actions and provide strategic analysis and long-range planning for a counterterrorism 
mission that requires continuous attention and focus on individuals and groups impacted 
by elements of many different agencies.  
C. HOLISTIC COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES 
A holistic counterterrorism strategy that is coordinated and implemented at the 
local level might allow government and community leaders to tailor approaches to 
counter radicalization and diminish the appeal of terrorist ideologies. 
The UK and Netherlands models demonstrate that joint-agency coordination at 
regional and local levels can help ensure that national strategies are resourced and 
prioritized correctly and in turn ensure that the central government is informed regarding 
the intricacies of the region.  
Regional coordination points for “whole government” activities have the capacity 
to provide “full-service” responses to communities. A network of these structures might 
allow the national counterterrorism apparatus to improve its overall capacity to reduce 
radicalization and increase security. Regional coordination might provide the following 
benefits:  
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• Foster partnerships of police and citizens to involve the whole community 
in strategies to promote greater public safety;  
• Take a problem-solving approach to identify and effectively address the 
underlying conditions that give rise to crime and disorder; 
• Transform the organization to respond to community needs more 
effectively; 
• Enhance understanding of interdisciplinary capabilities. (Scheider, 
Chapman, & Seelman, 2003) 
In developing an outreach strategy, it is critical to understand the threat that 
radicalization poses in one’s area of operations. “In other words, what is lacking in our 
understanding of ideology is an awareness of the local, cultural and communication 
contexts that allow for, even encourage, the viral spread of these ideas” (Corman, 
Goodall, & Trethewey, 2009, p. 3). 
D. REGIONAL AND LOCAL OUTREACH EFFFORTS 
Outreach and counter-radicalization policies must be developed and implemented 
locally. “Looking in from the outside won’t do. Abstract knowledge of the situation, even 
when detailed, does not capture the affective tone of the place, its nonverbal features, its 
emergent norms, or the ego involvement and arousal of being a participant.” (Zimbardo, 
2008, p. 322). Solutions can be supported from Washington, and headquarters agencies 
can provide tools to address radicalization, but interpersonal trust between local 
government officials and the Muslim community will ultimately have more influence on 
radicalization than political statements and government messaging because the 
interpersonal relationship has “practical credibility.”  
E. COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO COUNTER-RADICALIZATION 
The United States would benefit from counter-radicalization efforts that build 
affinity to “American-ness” while diminishing the “pervasive crisis of identity being 
experienced by Islamic communities” (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 26). The hard-power-only 
approach in the United States has “spawned unprecedented levels of distrust toward law 
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enforcement within the Arab and Muslim communities in the United States” (Cole, 2009, 
p. 276). The practical reality of fourth-generation wars is that individual experiences 
influence group opinion by reinforcing or conflicting with in-group/out-group 
perceptions. “While terrorism is ultimately a group activity,24 such a group will always 
comprise individuals, each of whom has a role to play in the movement. Anti-terrorism 
programs tend not to focus on individuals, but it is through understanding individual 
radicalization and its associated social and psychological qualities that effective ways of 
promoting disengagement can be developed” (Horgan, 2006). Therefore, an immediate 
goal of those who develop counter-radicalization strategies should be to consistently 
generate experiences that conflict with the terrorists’ frame of U.S. versus Islam conflict.  
Ideologies are “shaped by historical and cultural narratives, present perceived 
political and religious circumstances, and economic, social and familial realities. 
[Ideological frames are] enabled by everyday exchanges and interpretations of opinions, 
rumors, and accounts (Corman, Goodall, & Trethewey, 2009, p. 3). 
 When contact between law enforcement and the Muslim community is mostly 
based on suspicion and the parties view one another as potential adversaries, 
communication is inhibited. Counterterrorism investigators need to increase positive 
contact with the community to better understand the context of an individual’s behavior. 
This concept is easily extrapolated to groups—and reinforces the point that government 
leaders should be directly engaged with leaders of the Muslim community to interrupt the 
psychological process that leads to radicalization.  
The most efficient way to counter the appeal of terrorism and diminish 
radicalization, then, is for federal, state, and local government leaders to identify and 
fully engage with centers of influence (referent leaders) of at-risk and immigrant Muslim 
populations. Leaders of the counterterrorism mission at local and regional levels must 
become directly engaged. These representatives must be prepared to listen, seek to 
understand grievances, and constructively address those grievances where possible. It is 
                                                 
24 From a psychological perspective, terrorists who adhere to the West versus Islam narrative often act 
to avenge a wrong associated with Western government’s actions against a group that the terrorist identifies 
with, be it fellow Muslims, Palestinians, Arabs. 
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important that federal, state, and local activities be conducted in concert in order to avoid 
conflicting actions and ensure common messaging. This aspect of the counter-
radicalization mission is critical because “many terrorists act in a pro-social manner, both 
believing themselves to be serving society and judged by their in-group to  
be acting in its interest” (Victoroff, 2005, p.14). When governments provide a credible 
alternative to voice objection to existing policies and address community concerns, the 
argument for violent action is less compelling to the potential pool of extremists. 
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VIII. PARADIGM SHIFTS TO BE EMBRACED BY TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY COUNTERTERRORISTS 
For every complex problem there is a simple solution that is wrong. 
-George Bernard Shaw 
Rejecting the notion of a “zero sum game” is critical to success in 
counterterrorism and particularly in counter-radicalization efforts. The federal 
government, state and local governments, nongovernment agencies, and civil society can 
benefit when they work together to accomplish goals, even though the full spectrum of 
benefits may not be readily apparent. Widely shared technology (like cell phones and the 
Internet) and nearly unfettered travel make for a high degree of awareness and 
contribution. These circumstances allow small inputs to have significant effect on a broad 
array of situations.  
“Interconnectiveness” serves as a powerful tool for good or evil, dramatically 
lowers the cost of actions, and increases creates the potential for small numbers of people 
to have real impact on the masses. For these reasons, many organizations have a vested 
and tangible interest in contributing to joint projects: corporate consciousness is not 
wholly altruistic (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006). The value of the collective effort 
increases with each new member so there are important incentives for trusting and 
collaborating with others. 
Contributions of each member of “interest communities” bring additional insight 
and different resources that can be applied to the planning and execution of actions 
intended to address local challenges. Incorporating different perspectives into such a 
process can unleash a project’s potential (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 176). For this 
reason, continual expansion of the network might be an indicator of the organizations’ 
health (Gerenscer et al., 2008).  
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A. DECENTRALIZATION 
Decentralization and networks increase the likelihood of an organization’s 
survival and success. A decentralized and networked structure allows for contributing 
partners to capitalize on their individual strengths to be applied toward the group’s goal. 
Each partner is expected to leverage its individual network in a given region (Brafman & 
Beckstrom, 2006, p. 176) to create a structure and functionality that can both quickly 
adjust to a fluid environment and provide sufficient oversight to ensure that quality 
control is maintained. Well-developed networks are aware of local dynamics and can 
address emerging threats by bringing the right people, skills, and resources together at the 
right time and in the right place. Thus, a decentralized and networked structure provides 
qualitative value and financial incentive and innovation in a high-trust environment 
(Covey & Merrill, 2006, pp. 13-29).  
Scientific studies support this theory and might help overcome objection to a 
leader’s sense of “giving up control” to partner with other organizations. It is well 
established that when compared to highly centralized organizational structures, networks 
are more adaptive and equally efficient and that networks are “superior in terms of 
learning new contingencies and developing innovative procedures” (Ellis et al., 2003). 
This means that formation of partnerships is in the interest of all parties because it 
positively impacts effectiveness and the bottom line. Therefore, it is important and in 
everyone’s best interest to build and maintain trusting relationships that increase the 
speed of organizational actions. Such opportunities exist or can be realized where the 
interests of government, business, and civil society overlap (Gerenscer et al, p. 53). 
B. NONTRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP 
Leadership in the global environment requires investment in the community’s 
success. The globalized environment demands a different kind of leader than found in 
traditional hierarchical organizations where security is valued more than information. To 
function effectively in a decentralized and networked environment, organizational leaders 
must accept a collaborative posture: no single person can be in charge of every project; 
instead many people must play many roles (Bryson, 1995). Leaders of disparate 
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organizations must be willing to take the risk of extending trust (Covey & Merrill, 2006, 
p. 223) and supporting change for others by releasing absolute control (Gerenscer et al., 
2008, p. 200).  
The release of absolute control, however, does not equate to diminished 
responsibility for the leader. It is incumbent on leaders to exercise “smart trust,” a 
decision-making process that combines a willingness to trust with an analytical 
assessment of just how much confidence one might have in a partner or partner 
organization. As people and organizations work together on superordinate goals, trust 
should increase, reputations will be built, and personal relationships that might be 
leveraged for a different project are formed. This interpersonal dimension is fundamental 
to success in the global environment due to the varying roles that leaders play.  
Whether formally designated leader or serving in the capacity of an informal 
influencer, the individual(s) who link collaborative entities are critical to a successful 
venture. A decentralized and networked organization is inherently a complex system, so 
the person who serves as a “catalyst” must be capable of and intent upon understanding 
the perspectives of system partners (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 125) and effect 
change. They serve as leaders and should be endowed by parent organizations with the 
authority to interact with the cross-interest group and to carry plans from the collective to 
the parent organization because their principal role is to inspire trust (Covey & Merrill, 
2006). Here again, it is important for parent organization leaders to relinquish absolute 
control. Instead, the senior leader is responsible for creating an environment where work 
can be accomplished. 
Here, effective communication within and between organizations can provide a 
thorough understanding of other component interests and their ability to affect project 
outcomes. This is central to the collective’s ability to drive change. It is therefore 
important to win the trust and active participation of those leaders with high degrees of 
interest and power (Bryson, 1995, p. 338 ). 
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C. HETERARCHIES AND NEW LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES 
Heterarchies may facilitate a solution to overlapping interests, decentralized 
networks, and new leadership competencies. Those charged with the counter-
radicalization mission must recognize the impact of globalization across all economies 
and cultures. These changes require an organization to become more adaptive to meet 
local challenges and opportunities that might have strategic impact. The current terrorist 
threat emerges from learning networks that present a difficult challenge for bureaucratic 
systems like the government hierarchies in the United States. When hierarchical systems 
are unlinked, the threat posed by terrorists intensifies. A heterarchical structure—
somewhere between hierarchy and network—“provides horizontal links permitting 
different elements of an organization to cooperate, while they individually optimize 
success criteria” (Stephenson, 2009, p. 1).  
The combination of these themes—globalization, adaptability, and terrorism—is 
particularly relevant to today’s homeland security professional because it emphasizes the 
potential impact of individuals on entire systems that determine how individuals feel 
about their own security at individual and collective levels. Implementing change in a 
way that plays to the strength of an interconnected world, across many disparate groups, 
can provide leverage in other situations. Collaboration between companies, 
nongovernment organizations, the government, and civil society provides the ingredients 
for a more resilient society where new trusting relationships are perpetually generated 
between people and groups. These interlinkages can cause a nation to become more 
cohesive, more efficient, and empowered to make positive change.  
Local engagement should inform regional assessments, which in turn might 
inform or refine national strategies. A unified joint coordination structure, one that 
coordinates hard and soft power across multiple federal, state, and local agencies and 
interacts regularly with the Muslim community would have the ability to identify 
grievances and assess threats and community reaction to the government’s disruption 
tactics. Unless the government engages with those directly impacted by radicalization, 
grievance mitigation and threat resolution is not possible. For some in the government, 
this will be a walk in the dark, fraught with discomfort and fear of change. Others have 
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already begun the journey and deserve a coordinating mechanism to light the path ahead. 
This administration will set a course for either the polarization of American society—
which may lie only one successful terrorist attack ahead—or a future where interlinked 
and collaborating partners approach radicalizing influences jointly. 
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We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, 
policy, capabilities and management. 
-9/11 Commission 
The addition of soft-power tools to the existing hard-power strategy provides real 
opportunities to engage in the battle of ideas. Ideas cannot be arrested or targeted with 
bombs. Ideologies are best countered by creating experiences that conflict with 
preconceived stereotypes and the opponent’s narrative. Polarization in some communities 
within the United States has already reached the precipice of violence. Attracting the 
confidence of the American Muslim population through a holistic, whole-government 
effort might provide the best avenue to mitigate long-term social divisions, violent 
extremism, and the retributive cycle that will inevitably follow. As depicted in the 
strategy canvass below, the current deterrent strategy has severe long-term limitations, 
not least of which are social impact and the ability to collect information from volunteers 
within the community. 
As demonstrated by experiences in the UK and the Netherlands, soft power 
enables society, and particularly vulnerable groups, to counter ideology at the base level, 
the “ground floor” of Moghaddam’s “staircase to terrorist acts” because it changes the 
personal context of potential recruits to terrorism. A balanced-power approach also 
increases available options for dealing with threats and thus can be more effective than 
individual efforts. 
A. STRATEGY: IMPLEMENT A BALANCED STRATEGY  
• Soft-power tactics should be employed to counter the concept that Islam 
and democracy are incompatible. The government should support Muslim 
community leaders to achieve this goal. 
• The president of the United States should establish a homeland security 
coordination group (HSCG) within the NSC that functions similarly to the 
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joint chiefs of staff. The staff’s principal responsibilities would be to 
create and update an overarching strategy and ensure that the strategy is 
sufficiently resourced by component agencies to the HSCG’s regional 
commands.  
• Homeland security agencies should work from a holistic strategy: 
Regional Outreach and Operational Coordination Centers (ROOCC) 
should be established to coordinate a “whole government” approach to 
counterterrorism and counter-radicalization, tailoring actions to local 
contexts. NCTC is the logical apex organization. 
• ROOCC staffs should develop and coordinate two-pronged 
counterterrorism strategies that include both hard-power and soft-power 
tactics to address strategic goals. 
• In order to implement these strategy changes, the National Security 
Council should create a working group composed of subject-matter 
experts with both academic and practical experience in counterterrorism 
and counterinsurgency policing. 
• The NSC should implement a pilot program to test the strategy in an area 
where both positive relationships and active engagement is ongoing. 
B. STRUCTURE: DEMAND “UNITY OF EFFORT” ACROSS 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES  
• The HSCG should initiate a pilot ROOCC to identify primary and 
secondary centers of influence and community grievances program at the 
regional level. The ROOCC should initiate or expand relationships outside 
the government to create a diverse community of resources.  
• The ROOCC should work with key leaders to resolve legitimate 
grievances of the community and encourage projects affecting the centers 
of influence identified. 
• Research in academic form regarding social dynamics should be 
conducted and published in unclassified form for public consumption. 
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C. TOOLS TO SHAPE THE IDEOLOGICAL BATTLEFIELD 
• Key leaders of nongovernment organizations (NGO), religious groups, 
local policy makers, the private sector, the DHS, FBI, local law 
enforcement, and academia should jointly develop and support a 
curriculum to educate and inform the public regarding matters of 
community concern. 
• Once ROOCC staffs are firmly established, the joint service entity should 
plan, coordinate, and oversee all aspects of the counter-radicalization 
mission within their region. These staffs would implement their plans both 
as principals and through dedicated resources from participating agencies. 
Composition of these staffs would vary from region to region (determined 
by the overarching threat) but should include sufficiently senior officials 
from federal agencies, as well as state and local authorities, to coordinate 
and oversee activities of component agencies. Thus, the full array of tools 
available to the megacommunity could be applied to counter social 
polarization. 
• The ROOCC should produce or oversee production of locally relevant 
intelligence products that can serve to inform local strategists and local 
policy makers. Ideally, these bulletins would contain information that may 
be disseminated to the public. These products might improve 
communication with the Muslim community, increase awareness, and tend 
to deter terrorists who recognize that increased public awareness of threat 
means a more challenging operational environment for those with 
nefarious intent. 
 D. IMPACTING SOCIAL IDENTITY IN A POSITIVE WAY  
• The DHS and FBI should coordinate more closely in efforts to bridge the 
gap between federal and state and local law enforcement, with an aim to 
develop domestic policing standards for the counterterrorism mission.  
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Adoption or a return to community-policing models is an optimal 
condition that enhances intelligence collection and the public’s trust of the 
government.  
• New laws are needed to expedite removal of noncitizens who are of 
concern to national security. Countering violent Islamist rhetoric in some 
instances is as easy as deporting noncitizens who promote violence. This 
is currently a years-long process that allows an identified radicalizer to 
incite hatred and recruit terrorists, despite residing in the country illegally.  
• Safe space for public debate of controversial issues should be created to 
allow grievances to be vented. HSCG leaders should be prepared and 
empowered to address hard questions frankly and encourage critical 
debate from multiple perspectives. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The threat from homegrown Islamist terrorists will not just go away. During just 
ten days of October 2010, two separate incidents provided a glimpse of what may lie 
ahead from homegrown terrorists: Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, who tried to “fly to Pakistan 
and to Somalia and tried to enlist in the United States Army in the hope of joining the 
Iraqi insurgency,” was arrested in Honolulu, Hawaii (Fahim, Rashbaum, & Reporting, 
2010); and naturalized American citizen Farooque Ahmed of Ashburn, Virginia, was 
arrested for “planning to bomb Metro stations near the Pentagon and ‘kill as many 
military personnel as possible’ ” (Glod & White, 2010).  
The deep resonance of the West versus Islam narrative promises that this threat 
will continue to grow so long as the United States surrenders the ideological battlefield 
by pursuing only hard-power solutions to terrorism: this approach fuels Islamist rhetoric. 
As al Qaeda has morphed from a group to a movement, so too must the nation’s 
counterterrorism apparatus realign its approach to incorporate soft power to diminish 
radicalization.  
NSS 2010 recognized the imperative to counter domestic radicalization and to 
empower communities to aid in the fight, but it does not delineate roles and missions. 
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Counter-radicalization is an entirely new mission for domestic governance and 
counterterrorists. With limited resources and limited experience, the effort is at risk of 
being poorly implemented and poorly executed. And yet, to do nothing is not an option. 
Regional and local approaches are critical. Population density, the existence of 
ethnic enclaves, and socioeconomic standing of immigrant populations differ from place 
to place. Radicalization is evident in rural as well as metropolitan areas. Police forces, 
particularly in tough economic times, may be unable to support community policing 
models, and Muslim populations may relate in virtual rather than in geographic 
communities. These circumstances require tailored approaches that: 
1) Align with domestic as well as external threats;  
2) Ensure “unity of effort” across government agencies and include 
nongovernment and religious community leaders; 
3) Provide tools to shape the ideological struggle; and  
4) Aim to diminish in-group/out-group polarization by supporting social 
identities that are consistent with both Islam and national allegiance.  
Regional Outreach and Operational Coordination Centers (ROOCC) represent an 
opportunity to coordinate engagement activities and tailor local approaches across all 
levels of government, while simultaneously increasing cooperation between government 
agencies and creating a new space for government-community collaboration. 
ROOCCs should be staffed by senior representatives of federal, state, and local 
organizations who are also recognized as subject matter experts in counterterrorism, 
policing, and sociology. Charged with principal responsibility for coordinating hard- and 
soft-power strategies, the ROOCCs should orchestrate community outreach and counter-
radicalization initiatives of participating agencies and serve as a nexus to nongovernment 
agencies and religious groups with an interest in counter- and deradicalization efforts. 
Members of these ROOCC teams would take lead roles alternately, based on the nature 
of an individual program and individual specialties. They might also provide enhanced 
outreach (in more complex deradicalization efforts) and training to partner agencies at 
regional and local levels and partner with academic institutions to study social influences 
that impact the region.  
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While it is unrealistic to expect ROOCCs to offer a panacea for the challenge of 
terrorism, such an organization would have the capacity to understand local contexts and 
develop sustained relationships more effectively than any existing structure. Therefore, 
ROOCCs offer an enhanced capacity to develop tailored strategies to mitigate the growth 
of violent extremism. Finally, such a group is well positioned to support counter- and 
deradicalization efforts by the Muslim community through trusting relationships because 
the ROOCC would be both informed by and separate from those responsible for the 
application of hard power. 
The next successful terrorist attack in the United States will likely bring with it 
media frenzy and bitter political posturing that could preclude the development of a truly 
preventive counterterrorism policy. This thesis recommends ROOCCs be considered in 
detail now, while the opportunity to realign and positively engage still exists. Forewarned 
is forearmed. 
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